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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Differences in Tort Law 
In 1997, Athan Montgomery was born severely brain damaged due to Dr. Gregory 
Drezga’s negligent use of forceps during his delivery.  Heidi J. Judd, Athan’s mother, 
brought a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Drezga before a district court in Utah.  The 
jury found in favor of Heidi and Athan, awarding $22,735.30 for the expenses already 
incurred to maintain his life, and an additional $1,000,000 as the amount necessary to 
maintain his life during his expected lifespan.  Additionally, the jury awarded Athan 
$1,250,000 in noneconomic damages to compensate for “the difference between a life as 
a normal, healthy boy, and a life as he must now live it: severely brain damaged, with 
drastically reduced life experiences and expectations” (Judd v. Drezga 103 P.3d 135 
(2007)).   
  One year later in Ohio, another infant boy was rendered severely brain damaged 
due to medical negligence.  As a result of the negligent care he received during the first 
sixteen minutes of his life, baby Garrett suffered an oxygen deficiency resulting in 
permanent brain damage, cerebral palsy, and additional medical complications.  Garrett’s 
parents, Sharon and Christopher Bach, successfully sued the Dr. Dina DiCenzo for 
medical negligence.  The jury awarded both Sharon and Christopher $3,000,000 dollars 
and Garrett 15.4 million dollars in damages.  Additionally, the trial court granted the 
Bach’s motion for prejudgment interest, bringing the Bach’s total compensation to nearly 
twenty-four million dollars.   
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 Both the Judd and Bach families suffered incredible losses due to medical 
negligence which were recognized by two different juries, one in Utah and one in Ohio.    
The jury in Utah awarded Heidi Judd and Athan a little over two million dollars while the 
jury in Ohio awarded the Bach’s a combined total of nearly 24 million dollars.   While 
the jury verdicts produced dissimilar outcomes, the discrepancy in outcomes did not end 
with there.  In the case of Judd v. Drezga (2007), the Supreme Court of Utah upheld a 
legislative statute that limited the amount of noneconomic damages the Judd’s could 
receive to $250,000.  Hence, the jury verdict of $1,250,000 dollars in noneconomic 
damages was reduced to only $250,000.   
 In 1986, the Utah state legislature enacted a “tort reform” statute which placed a 
limit on the amount of noneconomic damages that could be recovered by victims of 
medical malpractice.  In 2004, Heidi Judd challenged the constitutionality of the statutory 
damage cap after the jury verdict she was awarded has been reduced by the court.  Judd 
claimed that the cap violated the open courts provision, the uniform operation of the laws 
provision, due process, the right to jury trial, and the separation of powers doctrine of the 
Utah State Constitution.   In a 3-2 decision, the Utah Supreme Court denied each of Heidi 
Judd’s claims, upholding the severe reduction in damages.  Hence, the final amount of 
compensation awarded to the Judd family was not a result of the jury verdict, but a rather 
a legislative enactment upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.   
 Though less direct, the Ohio Supreme Court and General Assembly (the state 
legislative branch), also defined the outcome in the Bach’s medical malpractice suit 
against Dr. DiCenzo.  In 1996, the Ohio General Assembly enacted H.B. 350 a 
comprehensive tort reform statute that included a cap on noneconomic damages of 
 
 
3 
 
200,000 dollars.  This provision, along with the entire statute, was struck down by the 
Ohio Supreme Court in the case of State ex. Rel Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward 86 Ohio St. 3d. 451 (1999).  In a 4-3 decision, a bitterly divided Ohio Supreme 
Court found that the tort reform statute violated the separation of powers doctrine and the 
“one-subject rule” of the Ohio Constitution.  As a result of the Court’s decision, the 
Bach’s received several million as opposed to $200,000 dollars in compensation for their 
suffering. 
 The different outcomes observed in the cases of Bach v. DiCenzo (2005) and Judd 
v. Drezga (2004) highlight the vast differences in public policy across the fifty-states.  
The cases’ disparate outcomes were a result of the interaction between the state 
legislatures and state supreme courts over the issue of damage caps.  Damage caps are 
just one specific type of tort reform statute that has been considered by state legislatures.  
Developments in tort law have been some of the most significant policy areas left 
primarily to the states and the inter-branch struggle for control of the tort system has been 
one of the most contentious separation of powers battles ever encountered in state 
governments.   
Tort law encompasses all cases in which persons sue to recover damages for civil 
wrongs resulting in death, damages, and injury.  The doctrines that facilitate resolution of 
tort law cases have traditionally been developed by the state supreme courts through their 
decisions concerning the common law.  The doctrines have changed dramatically over 
the last few decades and have sparked considerably controversy, causing state legislatures 
to consider legislative means of modifying or overturning the doctrines enunciated by the 
state supreme courts.  These legislative “tort reform” initiatives have not gone 
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unchallenged; state supreme courts have invalidated more than a hundred tort reform 
statutes (Schwartz and Lorber 2001).    
The tort reform movement has produced a legally and politically salient battle 
between state legislators and justices seeking to shape tort reform policy in conformity 
with their ideological preferences and their collective decisions have significantly 
influenced state tort litigation and its outcomes.  While the comparison between the Bach 
and Judd outcomes highlights the salient policy implications behind the tort reform 
movement, I want to further emphasize the vast differences in tort law across both space 
and time.   
Figure 1.1 displays the states in which damage caps were considered by 1985.   
Caps on noneconomic or punitive damages had been enacted by eight states by 1985.   In 
two of these states,  Illinois and New Hampshire, the state supreme courts had struck 
down the enacted damage caps, and in one state, California, a damage cap was upheld by 
the state supreme court.    
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Figure 1.1 Damage Cap Statutes in 1985 
  
 Green=Statute Enacted 
 Red=Statute Enacted and Struck Down 
Yellow=State Enacted and Upheld 
White=No Actions Taken  
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Figure 1.2 Damage Cap Statutes in 1995 
 
Green=Statute Enacted 
Red=Statute Enacted and Struck Down 
Yellow=State Enacted and Upheld 
White=No Actions Taken  
  
Figure 1.2 displays the reality of tort reform ten years later.  By 1995, there was 
substantially more activity across the fifty states.  Tort reform damage cap statutes had 
been enacted in all but seventeen states and judicial review of these statutes had taken 
place in well over half of these states.  Damage caps had been upheld by fourteen state 
supreme courts, and struck down by eleven.   
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Figure 1.3 Damage Cap Statutes in 2005 
 
Green=Statute Enacted 
Red=Statute Enacted and Struck Down 
Yellow=State Enacted and Upheld 
White=No Actions Taken  
 
By 2005, only eleven state legislatures had not passed any type of damage cap 
and all but fourteen state supreme courts had engaged in judicial review of a damage cap 
statute.  Figure 1.3 highlights the substantial differences in tort reform policy across the 
fifty-states.  In 2005, twenty-four different states had damage caps in place, while twenty-
six states did not, either because the state legislature never enacted a damage cap or 
because a state supreme court struck down a damage cap. Hence, the difference 
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highlighted between tort law in Utah versus Ohio is not an isolated example.  The 
differences in the tort reform movement have led to widely different outcomes in civil 
litigation cases across the fifty states.   
 
Tort Reform as a Separation of Powers Battle 
While the salient policy implications behind the tort reform movement make it 
interesting to study by itself, what makes tort reform theoretically interesting is that the 
struggle has taken place within an institutional context that has the potential to promote 
strategic behavior, in a separation of powers (SOP) system.   American governmental 
systems at both the state and federal levels are characterized by shared rather than strictly 
separated powers.  While the law-making power has been vested formally in the 
legislative branch and the interpretation of law in the judicial branch, in both theory and 
practice these formal lines are transgressed frequently.  Hence, in reality, the 
development of public policy in SOP systems depends critically on the interactive 
cooperation of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, any one of which may foreclose 
policy making via inaction, veto, or judicial review.   
SOP systems may foster contentious political environments in which participants 
vie for strategic control over policy outcomes.  Because legislators and justices 
understand that policy outcomes are ultimately dependent not only on their own choices 
but on the choices of other political actors in the system, they have the incentive to act 
strategically in light of the anticipated behavior of other players in the SOP system.  
Hence, policies emerging from these systems, such as tort reforms, may be perceived as 
the product of interdependent decision-making by strategic actors.   
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Within this dissertation, I will analyze the strategic interaction between state 
actors using a theoretical model that accounts for the preferences of the actors involved 
and the institutional structures that channel those preferences to produce certain policy 
outcomes.   Through the lens of the tort reform movement, I will investigate how public 
policy is shaped by the interdependent decision-making of elite actors.  Hence, the goal is 
to provide both a general model of how policy is formulated under a system of separate 
powers and a concrete explanation of how the tort reform movement has developed in the 
fifty states.   
While the impact of SOP has been studied extensively at the national level, it has 
not been much considered in the study of policy making at the state level.  Yet state 
legislation as shaped by these various governmental actors constitutes a substantial 
source of legal policy affecting the nation’s citizens.  Developments in tort law have 
created a natural experimental setting in which to examine how separation of powers 
affects public policy in the state governments.  The different tort reform developments 
across the fifty states offer a wide array of institutional features, diverse political 
environments, and elites with disparate political goals.   
Within this dissertation, I offer a strategic account of state policy-making in 
which both legislators and justices might choose to act contrary to their sincere 
preferences in the short term in order to maximize their policy objectives in the long run 
(Epstein and Knight 1998).   Following a rational choice paradigm, I assume that both 
legislators and justices are policy-motivated actors who prefer to move policy in their 
ideologically desired direction while simultaneously maintaining their institutional 
position and preserving the legitimacy of their institution. 
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  Hence, I utilize a neo-institutional approach to examine the behavior of state 
elite actors. Neo-institutional approaches are part of a broader trend in recent social 
science scholarship that displays “a renewed interest in studying how political behavior is 
given shape, structure, and direction by particular institutional arrangements and 
relationships” (Gillman and Clayton 1999:5).  Neo-institutionalism contends that 
legislators and justices have policy objectives, but they must act to achieve their policy 
goals within a constrained political environment. Different intra-and inter-institutional 
constraints may encourage strategic behavior through each stage of the policy-making 
process.  
 I evaluate the different conditions that foster strategic behavior at each stage of 
the policy-making process by considering the different intra-and inter-institutional 
constraints on elite behavior.  Specifically, I examine the conditions that foster strategic 
decision-making by legislators when choosing whether or not to enact a statute and the 
conditions that foster strategic decision-making by justices when exercising the power of 
judicial review. 
To get to the heart of these questions and lay the theoretical groundwork for my 
empirical analysis, I rely upon a formal state separation of powers model (SSOP), in 
which public policy is viewed as the final result of the interaction of institutional context, 
the political environment, and the competing preferences of elite actors.   I argue that it is 
the interaction of these three factors that best explain the differences in tort law across the 
fifty states and in combination provide the most realistic explanation of state policy-
making.  The rest of this chapter is spent elaborating on these three factors and why they 
are of central importance to my theory.   
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The Preferences of Elite Actors 
 One of the most significant inter-institutional constraints on the behavior of elite 
actors is assumed to be the preferences of the coordinate branch.  Central to my theory is 
the assumption that both legislators and justices have policy preferences and have an 
opportunity to express their policy preferences within the context of state policy-making.  
If legislators and justices are not policy-minded individuals cable of pursuing policy-
minded goals then there is no need for a strategic theory to explain policy-making.  
Fortunately, much evidence suggests that both legislators and justices purse policy-
minded goals.  Stemming originally from the field of economics, the rational choice 
model portrays political elites as rational beings who are able to rank order their goals 
and then pursue the goals that maximize their utility.   
 While acknowledging that legislators pursue multiple goals, one important goal is 
thought to be pursuing policies in line with their ideologies.   A wealth of literature 
supports the idea that legislators care about the ultimate fate of public policy (Miller and 
Stokes 1963; Wittman 1983; Alesina 1985; Calvert 1985) and that legislative preferences 
affect legislative behavior (Fiorina 1974; Entman 1983; Poole and Rosenthal 1985).   
Additionally, there is no denying that the legislative branch must play a fundamental role 
in the policy-making process.  By constitutional design the role of the legislature is to 
“legislate,” and there is substantial evidence that legislative preferences do predict 
legislative outcomes (MacRae 1958, 1965, 1970; Clausan 1973; Jackson 1971, 1974; 
Poole 1981; Poole and Smith 1983; Poole and Rosenthal 1984).  Hence, the assumption 
that legislatures have both the desire and the ability to pursue public policy in line with 
their ideological preferences is well grounded within the discipline.   
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 Justices, like legislators, are expected to have and be able to pursue policy-minded 
goals as well.  Again, much evidence lends support to this dual assumption.  The 
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making postulates that the primary goal of justices 
is to vote in line with their ideological preferences.  The attitudinal model is the most 
dominant model of judicial decision-making within the last half century, especially when 
studying the Supreme Court (Pritchett 1948; Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 
2002).  Central to the attitudinal model is the notion that justices act as policy-makers; 
justices’ votes serve as a direct expression of their policy preferences.  
  While the attitudinal model has been tested more frequently in Supreme Court 
research, it has also influenced the study of mid-level courts as well (Songer, Davis, and 
Haire 1994; Hall and Brace 1989; Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999; Hettinger, Lindquist, 
and Martinek 2006).   The attitudinal model acknowledges that the U.S. Supreme Court is 
in a unique position that allows the justices to primarily vote their ideologies, but studies 
of the mid-level courts support the idea that lower court justices pursue policy-minded 
goals as well.   A strategic theory of state policy-making does not require that justices 
only have policy-minded goals, only that policy preference is one significant influence on 
their behavior.  (I expand this point in later sections.) 
 The power of judicial review provides courts with the opportunity to insert their 
policy preferences in the policy-making process.  The power of judicial review, 
established in Marbury v. Madison ICR. 137 (1803), gives each court in the United States 
the power to invalidate laws in conflict with the United States or state constitutions.  
Judicial review allows judges to evaluate actions by the legislative branch on 
constitutional grounds. Essentially, judicial review gives judges the power to “unmake 
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public policy” (Langer 2002).   In exercising the power of judicial review, judges can 
influence the nature of existing public policy while also shaping the future of public 
policy (Langer 2002). In theory, when choosing to invalidate a state law, state supreme 
court justices put their own policy preferences over those of the state legislature.   
 The power of judicial review has long been used by state supreme court justices 
to enhance their role in the policy-making process (Sheldon 1987). Charles Sheldon 
discovered that some state supreme courts declared legislative enactments 
unconstitutional even before Marbury v. Madison (1803).    And since the 1970’s 
scholars have noted that state supreme courts have taken on a more active role in the 
policy-making process (Sheldon 1987, Tarr and Porter 1998, Glick 1991). Evidence 
suggests that state supreme court justices use the power of judicial review to advance 
their policy preferences (Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999, Langer 1997, 2002; Stricko-
Neubauer 2006).   
 Because justices and legislators are both policy-motivated and have the ability to 
affect public policy, a separation of powers system of government produces a contentious 
environment when legislators and justices simultaneously hold competing preferences.  
Because the development of public-policy within these systems depends on the 
interactive cooperation of these coordinate branches, differences in policy preferences 
can encourage conflict and retaliation (Langer 2002).  Langer (2002) explains that “the 
relationship among state governmental actors is one characterized by political pressure, 
political games, and contentious behavior” (11). 
Separation of powers models have been developed to examine the impact of inter-
branch conflict on both judicial and legislative outcomes (Marks 1989; Eskridge 1991; 
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Gely and Spiller 1990; Martin 2001; Vanberg 2001; Rogers 2001).  SOP models assume 
that both legislators and justices are rational actors who must often engage in strategic 
rather than sincere behavior to maximize their own utility.  In particular, SOP models 
propose that legislators and justices vote strategically and prospectively by considering 
the possible reactions of other governmental actors. Elite actors behave strategically 
when they recognize that their ability to achieve their goals is dependent upon the 
preferences and expected actions of other actors (Epstein and Knight 1997).   Instead of 
following their personal or sincere preferences in the short-term, elite actors might 
behave contrary to their sincere preferences in order to maximize their utility in the 
future.  
 Strategic behavior occurs when legislators or justices alter their behavior in 
response to threats by one another (Langer 2002).  An example would be a state supreme 
court avoiding judicial review of a statute it would prefer to strike down because it fears 
retaliation from a state legislature  or, instead, a state legislature choosing not to enact a 
statute it would prefer to see enacted because it fears that the court will strike it down.  
Separation of powers models can allow us to predict under which contexts we expect 
justices or legislators to behave strategically rather than sincerely.  To put it another way, 
SOP models can allow us to predict when both legislators and justices are expected to be 
constrained within the policy-making process.   
 The impact of SOP and the strategic behavior of elite actors have been studied in 
a number of ways.   Scholars have translated strategic assumptions into variables to 
include in their quantitative analysis (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000), used 
strategic assumptions as a starting point for qualitative analysis (Schelling 1960; Murphy 
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1962; North 1990; Knight and Epstein 1996), and have undertaken formal equilibrium 
analysis (Marks 1989; Eskridge 1991; Calderia, Wright and Zorn 1999; Vanberg 2001; 
Rogers 2001).   The prevalence and success of these multifaceted SOP models speaks to 
the relevance of beginning any study of state policy-making through a separation of 
powers lens.  
 However, while SOP models have been developed extensively in connection with 
studies of the Supreme Court and Congress, they have been far less employed in the 
study of policy-making at the state level (for notable exceptions see Traut and Emmert 
1998, Brace, Hall, Langer 1999, Langer and Brace 2005).  The most comprehensive state 
SOP study to date is Laura Langer’s Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts (2002). 
Langer utilizes a quantitative approach to analyze for 1970-1993 what conditions foster 
the exercise of review in four areas of law.  Langer’s work lays the important 
groundwork for understanding SOP at the state level by introducing a spatial model to 
explain what conditions encourage strategic rather than sincere behavior by state supreme 
court justices.     
Langer’s model depicts a situation in which legislative ideology is thought to 
constrain the influence of judicial ideology in the decision-making process.  Justices 
operate in “contextual safety zones” that depict the extent to which justices anticipate 
retribution for their voting behavior.   One of the primary determinants in conceptualizing 
a justices “safety zone” is the ideological distance between the court and the state 
legislature.  Langer finds that in issue areas that are salient to the legislature, legislative 
ideology does constrain the behavior of justices.  When the ideological divide between a 
court and legislature is extreme, justices are less likely to vote their sincere preferences. 
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Similarly, Stricko-Neubauer (2006) considers the influence of legislative ideology on 
judicial decision-making in four different issue areas. She finds that in cases addressing 
social issues, divergent ideology does promote strategic behavior. 
 Studies have suggested that legislators behave strategically as a result of divergent 
preferences as well.  Langer and Brace (2005) have modeled a legislature’s decision to 
enact public policy as a game between state supreme courts and legislatures.  They 
examine the influence of court ideology on the enactment of state abortion and death 
penalty laws since 1970, and find that the courts’ policy preferences encourage/ 
discourage the likelihood of policy enactment.   This result has been referred to as the 
“passive influence” of judicial review (Brace and Hall 2001; Langer and Brace 2005; 
Vanberg 2005). With the passive influence, the mere threat of judicial review by the court 
keeps the legislature from enacting a statute.   Hence, rather than playing only a 
reactionary role in the policy-making process, courts are seen as active petitioners 
playing salient roles in the legislative enactment stage as well (Shipan 1997; Wilhelm 
2005).    Wilhelm’s (2005) research supports this view that the state supreme court’s 
power of judicial review is preemptory.  She finds that the justices actually petition 
legislatures to alter public policy before it becomes law through their docket, ideological 
disposition, and the likelihood of intervention.   
  The above research supports the view that competing elite preferences play a 
salient role in the policy-making process. Because both justices and legislators have the 
desire and means to pursue policy-minded goals, a strategic account of elite behavior is 
necessary.   The ability of legislators and justices to achieve their goals depends on the 
preferences of one another. Under a system of separate powers, legislatures and justices 
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might have to behave strategically rather than sincerely in the short term in order to 
maximize their policy-minded goals in the long-term.  Additionally, the salience of 
competing preferences is conditioned by the political environment in which the elite 
actors are operating.   The political environment in which the court and legislature 
operate structures their interaction.   
 
The Political Environment 
 
Broadly Defined  
 Though policy disagreement between the legislature and the court is central to my 
strategic account, it is only one among many inter-institutional constraints which might 
promote strategic behavior.  I define these additional inter-institutional features as the 
broader “political environment”.  Many different factors might define the political 
environment, including mass public opinion, interest group preferences, preferences of 
the executive branch, political party influence, state inter-party competition, state 
demographics, and regional influence.   I argue that these different factors combine in 
different ways to create a policy environment that is either hostile or receptive to certain 
policies such as tort reform.   The political environment may act as direct constraint on 
elite decision-making and may also condition the interaction between the legislative and 
judicial branches.  The formal model I develop in Chapter II further examines direct and 
indirect effects of the political environment on elite decision-making.  In this section, I 
first define some of the features that influence the political environment broadly 
speaking, and highlight their possible effect on elite decision-making.  Next, I argue that 
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the political environment is conceptualized differently based upon different issue areas 
and I specifically discuss the political environment in which tort reforms have been 
considered by state elite actors.   
In order for factors in the political environment to promote strategic behavior, 
legislators and justices must both be aware of these factors and consider them relevant 
when making their decisions.  Much existing literature suggests that both legislatures and 
justices pay attention to a number of different inter-institutional factors and that certain 
factors do promote strategic behavior.   For instance, much evidence suggests the public 
opinion has a salient effect on elite decision making.      
The relationship between public opinion and legislative behavior is fairly direct. 
In pursuing the goal of reelection, legislators must be sensitive to public opinion.  
Legislators are aware of constituency opinion and it significantly affects their choices.  
Numerous studies have shown a connection between constituency preferences and roll-
call voting (Kuklinski 1978; Uslander and Weber 1979; Erikson and Wright 1980; 
Schwartz, Fenmore, and Volgy 1980; Page et al. 1984) and a causal link has been 
established between citizen ideology and state policy outputs (Wright, Erikson, and 
McIver 1987, 1993; Hill and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Norrander 2000; Brace et al. 2002).    
Public opinion has been shown to influence the behavior of the judicial branch as 
well.    Lawrence Baum (2006) argues that Supreme Court justices pay attention to their 
“audiences”.    Supreme Court justices have been known to care about their depiction by 
the media (Davis 1994), grant interviews (Glendon 1994), and respond to press criticisms 
(Jeffries 1994).  Additionally, scholars have shown congruence between the justices’ 
positions on specific issues and public opinion (Barnum 1985; Marshall and Ignagni 
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1994; Weissberg 1976; Marshall 1989).   Scholars have also demonstrated a relationship 
between broad public opinion patterns and the justices’ preferences (Mishler and Sheehan 
1993 1996; Link 1995; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995).  Note, however, that other 
scholars argue that this connection has been overstated (Norpoth and Segal 1994; 
Flemming and Wood 1997). 
Studies that find any connection between public opinion and Supreme Court 
decision-making are particularly interesting considering the insulated position of the 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court is thought to be isolated from public pressure. 
Supreme Court justices were granted life tenure so that “the independence of judges may 
be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in society” 
(Hamilton, Federalist 78).   Yet despite life tenure, some evidence suggests that Supreme 
Court justices are influenced by public opinion.  We might expect this relationship to be 
even more prominent in courts where the institutional design does not foster the same 
degree of judicial independence.  Like legislators, the majority of state supreme court 
justices face the electorate at some point in their judicial careers.  Hence we might expect 
a stronger and more direct relationship between public opinion and the behavior of 
justices who must seek reelection.  Studies of judicial decision-making in the state 
supreme courts support this relationship.  
Brace and Hall (1995, 1997) and Brace, Hall, and Langer (1999), Hall and Brace 
(1992) and Hall (1992) have highlighted the important role selection method and public 
opinion play in influencing judicial behavior in the state courts.  The authors find that the 
impact of public opinion is often conditioned by a state’s judicial selection method and 
that the justices’ sensitivity to public opinion may promote strategic voting behavior in 
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some circumstances.  Additionally, Stickland-Neubauer (2006) incorporated public 
opinion into her model of judicial review in the state supreme courts and found some 
evidence that justices behave strategically in light of public opinion.   The above research 
suggests that state supreme court justices do pay attention to public opinion and that 
under certain conditions public opinion promotes strategic behavior.    
Scholars have also demonstrated that interest group participation can significantly 
affect judicial decision-making.   Interest group participation in the form of amicus briefs 
has been shown to frame issues (Epstein and Kobylka 1992), lead to higher winning 
percentages at the decision-on-the merits stage (Sorauf 1976; Lawrence 1990; McGuire 
1990), and to increase the likelihood of cases being heard (Calderia and Wright 1988; 
McGuire and Caldeira (1993).  A wealth of research suggests that interest group activity 
significantly influences the behavior of legislative elites as well (for examples see 
Truman 1951; Lowi 1969; Olson 1982; Schumaker et al. 1986; Gray and Lowery 1996).   
Pressure from organized interests sends signals to both legislatures and courts about the 
state of the political environment and often significantly affects the choices made therein.   
Furthermore, the preferences of the executive branch might also shape the 
political environment.   When enacting legislation, the legislature must take into account 
the threat of executive veto.  If the state legislature suspects that a bill is likely to be 
vetoed by the governor they might behave strategically by declining to pursue the bill in 
the first place.  Also a governor might assert pressure on the legislature to pursue certain 
policies.  For instance, in Florida Governor Jeb Bush issued a press release regarding tort 
reform that urged the Florida Legislature to take action.  Governor Jeb Bush stated 
“Several states have enacted tort reform recently, and without significant action, Florida 
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risks falling behind and jeopardizing its jobs-friendly business climate.  I look forward to 
working with the House and Senate this session on these important civil justice issues” 
(released March 15, 2005).    
The executive branch has been shown to influence the behavior of judicial actors 
as well.  The president of the United States and the state governors can petition the courts 
through their respective solicitor or attorney generals.  These individuals represent the 
executives’ interests through both legal representation and the submission of amicus 
briefs.  Solicitor General participation has been shown to contribute to increased 
executive success before the Supreme Court (Calderia and Wright 1988; Segal 1990; 
Salokar 1992; George and Epstein 1992).  Hence, while my main focus is on the 
interaction between justices and legislatures, I must also take into account the preferences 
of the executive branch as a possible inter-institutional constraint. The executive may 
significantly contribute to whether a political environment is hostile or receptive to 
changing the status quo.  
In addition, a variety of state-level factors might also contribute to the nature of 
the political environment.  For instance, the level of state inter-party competition has 
been shown to affect state policy outputs (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; 
Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002).   Different socioeconomic factors, such as state 
expenditures and urbanism, have been shown to influence state policy-making as well 
(Glick and Vines 1973; Atkins and Glick 1976; Glick and Pruet 1986).   Regional factors 
have also been shown to influence state policy-making.  Policy diffusion effects have 
been witnessed, meaning that states are more likely to adopt certain policies if 
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neighboring states have adopted them (Hays and Glick 1997; Minstrom 1997; Mooney 
2001).   
In summary, a variety of factors contribute to a broad definition of a state’s 
“political environment.”   Whether or not an overall environment is supportive or hostile 
to certain policies may be defined by public opinion, interest group participation, 
executive preferences, state demographics, and regional factors.   While this list is by no 
means exhaustive, I argue that these specific inter-institutional factors might encourage 
strategic behavior by state government elites.  However, these different factors are 
expected to influence elite behavior only under certain conditions.   
 Consider the influence of public opinion, for example.  Public opinion should not 
be expected to constrain judicial decisions unless three conditions are met.   First, the 
justices must be aware of the direction of public opinion.  If the justices cannot decipher 
the public mood or if the public has no opinion on an issue, then public opinion will have 
no salient effect on judicial decision-making.  Second, the public must pay attention to 
the decisions made by the state supreme court.    If the justices know the mass public is at 
odds with their sincere preferences, yet the public never pays attention to the behavior of 
the court, then the justices have no reason to act strategically.  And finally, in order for 
public opinion to encourage strategic behavior, the public must have some means of 
punishing justices who oppose public opinion.  Even if the court knows public opinion is 
at odds with their sincere preferences and that the public is paying attention to the court’s 
actions, the justices can still behave sincerely as long as the public has no means of 
punishing them.  Hence, justices who never face reelection are less likely to be 
constrained by public opinion.  
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The public opinion example highlights the importance of considering the unique 
political environment in which different issues are considered.   For instance, factors such 
as level of issue salience matter.  Public opinion, interest groups, and the executive 
branch will not constrain behavior in issue areas in which the mass public, organized 
interests, and the government are not interested.  Hence, what makes tort reform such an 
interesting lens from which to study state policy-making is the widespread attention to 
the issue.  The tort reform movement has received widespread attention by both elites and 
the mass public, creating the perfect natural experimental setting in which to examine the 
effects of the political environment.  In the preceding section, I discuss in detail the 
nature of the political environment in the context of state tort reform. 
 
Defining the Tort Reform Environment    
 In the context of state tort reform, I argue that the campaign for reform has been 
elite-driven and that the media and interest groups have worked together to create a 
political environment that has become increasingly supportive of tort reform.   The 
success of the pro-reform movement in framing the debate over tort reform can be 
attributed to a number of different factors including: the strength of the “pop tort reform” 
policy entrepreneurs; selective media coverage of civil litigation and the use of “tort 
tales”; the accessibility of the pro-reform message; and the failure of tort reform 
opponents to utilize outsider strategies successfully (Daniels and Martin 1995, Haltom 
and McCann 2004).   
Haltom and McCann (2004) argue that the most successful policy entrepreneurs 
in the tort reform movement have been the “populist tort reformers.”   They use the label 
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“pop tort reformers” to tie together a diverse group of actors including “corporate-
sponsored policy elites, intellectuals, public relations specialists, lobbyists, and media 
personalities” all who advocate reform of the tort system (Haltom and McCann 2004, 
15).  The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) has been cited as one of the most 
influential and far reaching “pop tort reform” groups because of its ability to appeal to the 
mass public (Haltom and McCann 2004).   Haltom and McCann (2004) describe the 
ATRA as the “primary agent of systematization, creation, and dissemination of 
knowledge for pop reform of civil justice” (43).   The ATRA, among other pop tort 
reform groups, has been extremely influential in framing the debate over tort reform 
through the use of “outsider strategies” (Kingdon 1984, Haltom and McCann 2004).  By 
choosing to “go public”,  pro-reformers have successfully infiltrated the media with 
negative stories about civil law and in turn have framed how citizens view the civil 
justice system (Ricci 1993, Haltom and McCann 2004).     
Haltom and McCann (2004) have identified the intrinsic relationship between the 
“pop tort reform” groups and the mass media.  They use the label “tort tales” to describe 
the different anecdotes and horror stories told about civil justice in the United States, a 
prime example being the story of the woman who sued McDonalds after spilling hot 
coffee.  After systematic analysis of the news coverage of civil litigation across the 
country, Haltom and McCann (2004) conclude that there has become a “blurred 
convergence of serious news, mass entertainment, and pop reform propaganda” (15).  
They find a clear pro-reform bias, with newspaper articles frequently claiming that 
litigation costs too much, lawyers are greedy, civil damages have soared, and civil suits 
are frivolous.   
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The pro-reform message as expressed in the media has significantly influenced 
mass public opinion on civil litigation in the United States (Daniels and Martin 1995, 
Haltom and McCann 2004).  The success of the pro-reform movement can be attributed 
to the accessibility of the message.   The “tort tales” are framed in a particular format and 
include clear villains and heroes (Daniels and Martin 1995, Stone 1997, Haltom and 
McCann 2004).  Additionally, by emphasizing traditional American values such as 
individualism and personal responsibility, the pro-tort reform message connects nicely 
with the conservative values emphasized in the broader culture wars debate (Haltom and 
McCann 2004).  The opponents of tort reform have not succeeded in framing their 
arguments in an equally accessible manner.  While many scholars have challenged the 
existence of a “litigation crisis” through an accumulation of data, “such sophisticated 
forms of knowledge simply do not translate into modern mass communication” (Haltom 
and McCann 2004, 109).  Additionally, the most prominent anti- reform group, the 
American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) has chosen to focus on insider strategies 
rather than influencing mass public opinion (Daniels and Martin 1995, Haltom and 
McCann 2004). 
In summary, research suggests that pro-reform interest groups, especially the 
ATRA, and biased media coverage have produced an overall political environment that is 
conducive to tort reform.  However, while these arguments are convincing, they do not 
systematically consider how the pro-reform message varies across both space and time.  
Because this dissertation looks at the tort reform movement across all fifty states between 
1975 and 2004, I can consider how changes in the political environment affect elite 
decision-making.  Building from the arguments above, I expect that as exposure to media 
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coverage increases and when the influence of pro-reform interest groups is present the 
political environment will increase the likelihood of successful tort reform in a state, 
essentially by empowering the branch of government which seeks tort reform.   
Additionally, I assume that citizens’ political predispositions will affect how 
different states react to the pro-reform message and formulate opinions on tort reform.  
Zaller (1992) argues that the formation of mass public opinion is affected by both the 
extent of the exposure to elite discourse on the issue and the political predispositions of 
the citizenry.  Hence, the political environment depends on both the political 
predispositions of the citizenry and the degree and nature of exposure to elite discourse 
on tort reform.  The most supportive political environment is one in which the majority of 
citizens are conservative and have been exposed to pro-reform news coverage.   
While the nature of the political environment is expected to influence the 
interaction between the coordinate branches, its effect is mediated by the institutional 
structure of the state.  The effects of the political environment on elite behavior are 
conditioned by institutional structure.   For example, I argue above that citizens in 
conservative states who have been exposed to pro-reform news coverage are more likely 
to support tort reform.  If justices are aware of this public support, they might be more 
likely to uphold tort reform legislation even if their sincere preferences would suggest 
they would prefer to strike the legislation down.    This strategic behavior might be 
heightened for justices seeking reelection because their careers are beholden to the 
people.  Additionally, justices with longer tenures might be more likely to behave 
sincerely because the people have less of an opportunity to punish them for failing to 
heed to their preferences.   Institutional features provide linkages between the elite actors 
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and the broader political environment. As explained by Brace and Hall (1999): “Judges’ 
goals are pursued strategically in response to context and to institutional arrangements 
that link the two” (285).    Hence, the influences of public opinion, interest group 
participation, executive preferences, and any additional factors that make up the political 
environment, depend upon institutional design.     
 
The Institutional Structure 
The neo- institutional approach to studying elite decision-making is attractive 
because it explicitly defines the relationship between the external political environment 
and the institutional structure.  As advanced by Hall and Brace (1999), the neo-
institutional approach acknowledges that the goals of justices are institutionally 
dependent.   Different institutional features create to a greater or lesser degree linkages to 
the political environment.  Judges respond to a “host of stimuli” which are modified by 
structural characteristics that can minimize or enhance their importance.  Recall the 
previous discussion concerning selection method:  The importance of public opinion 
(external environment) is enhanced when justices face elections (institutional design).  
The influence of the external environment on judicial behavior is conditioned by the 
institutional structure. 
Research supports this inter-dependent relationship between institutional structure 
and political environment.  Elected judges have been found more responsive to the 
political environment than appointed justices (Brace and Hall 1997; Traut and Emmert 
1998; Hall and Brace 1999). Justices in states with high electoral competition are found 
to be particularly responsive to their political environment (Brace and Hall 1993 1997; 
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Hall and Brace 1999).  The goals of elected justices are interdependent; the justices must 
balance the goal of pursuing policy with the goal of reelection (Hall 1987, 1992, 1995).  
And while justices retained by the legislature or governor are freer from electoral 
pressures (Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999) they might be more constrained by the 
preferences of the legislature or governor.  Hence, we see the mutually dependent 
relationship between the political environment and the institutional structure.  What 
stimuli receive the greatest response from a justice (elite preferences or public opinion) 
depend upon his or her method of selection. 
While selection method is one important institutional constraint, many other 
institutional variations exist between the state supreme courts which influence judicial 
behavior. The behavior of justices is influenced by the existence of an intermediate 
appellate court (Glick and Pruet 1986; Hall and Brace 1989; Brace and Hall 1990), 
opinion assignment procedures (Hall and Brace 1989; Brace and Hall 1990), vote order 
(Hall and Brace 1989, 1992; Brace and Hall 1990), and judicial term lengths (Brace and 
Hall 1995, 1997).    Each of these institutional features might encourage strategic 
behavior when interacted with the political environment.  For example, justices with 
longer term lengths should be more willing to vote their sincere preferences when facing 
a hostile political environment than justices with shorter term lengths.  Additionally, 
justices operating in a system with an intermediate appellate court might have greater 
opportunities to advance their sincere preferences because they have greater control over 
choosing which cases they want to hear.   While I will talk more about specific 
hypotheses later in the dissertation, these examples highlight the relationship between 
intra- and inter-institutional constraints.   
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State legislatures, like state courts, vary greatly in their institutional design.  
Measures of legislative professionalism have been devised in order to conceptualize the 
institutional differences that characterize state legislatures (Berkman 1994; Berry, 
Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Squire 1992, 2007).  The most recent measure of 
professionalism, introduced by Peverill Squire (2007), defines professionalism in terms 
of legislative salary and benefits, time demands of service, and staff and resources.  
Squire finds that much variation exists between the state legislatures among all of these 
features.  As with justices, the goals of legislators are institutionally dependent.  Their 
ability to pursue their policy goals or respond to the stimuli of their political environment 
is conditioned by their level of professionalism.  Legislatures with limited resources will 
have a more difficult time translating their sincere policy preferences into law.   
 Just as institutional structure conditions the relationship between elite behavior 
and the political environment, it conditions the relationship between the two coordinate 
branches as well.   Remember that legislators or justices might be persuaded to act 
strategically rather than sincerely when they fear retaliation by the coordinate branch.  
While a difference in policy preferences is thought to be an important predictor of 
retaliation, it is not the only signal.  Institutional features may send important signals as 
well.  For instance, a court might fear retaliation less if it knows it is dealing with a less 
professional legislature that might not have the means to retaliate.  Or a legislature might 
be more inclined to enact a statute against the preferences of an elected court when it 
knows that public opinion is against the court.   Institutional structure acts as the linkage 
between competing elite preferences and the political environment.   
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A Strategic Approach to State Policy-Making 
  The American states make up fifty different laboratories in which to examine how 
different intra and inter-institutional features might constrain the behavior of elite actors.  
Utilizing a fifty state comparative design allows me to simultaneously consider an 
immense array of both contextual and institutional hypotheses concerning the strategic 
behavior of state elites.  The fifty states offer a wide array of institutional features, 
diverse political environments, and elites with disparate political goals.   
 While the fifty states in themselves provide an ideal natural experimental setting, 
the tort reform movement provides additional sources of variation.  State elites differ in 
the direction and intensity of their preferences regarding tort reform.   Public opinion as 
well as interest group attention varies in degree and directionality as well.  Also, state 
courts differ in the types of tort cases heard and the percentage of their docket comprised 
of tort cases (Brace, Hall, and Langer 2001).  The development of the tort reform 
movement in the fifty states has been a dynamic process in which legislators and justices 
have sought to advance their own policy goals in environments that often promote 
strategic behavior.   
 Through the course of this dissertation, I will continue to advance the argument 
that state public policy is the end result of the interaction between elite preferences, 
political environment, and institutional structure.  In the course of this introduction, I 
have suggested several features which might encourage strategic behavior by elite actors.   
As my dissertation progresses, I will seek to identify the specific conditions under which 
both legislators and justices are expected to behave strategically.   I develop a general 
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theory regarding how policy is formulated under a system of separate powers and test that 
theory empirically in the real-world context of tort reform in the fifty states.   
 In the next chapter, I introduce my formal state separation of powers model 
(SSOP).    Through the formal model, I am able to capture the dynamic relationship 
between legislatures and courts and also account for the influence of the political 
environment and institutional structure.  Through equilibrium analysis, I generate a 
number of hypotheses that are empirically tested in Chapters III-V.  In Chapter III, I 
evaluate a legislature’s decision whether or not to enact a tort reform statute. Within 
Chapter IV, I consider the judicial agenda-setting stage by evaluating a state supreme 
court’s decision to accept a case challenging the constitutionality of a tort reform statute.  
Chapter V considers individual justices’ votes in cases challenging tort reform statutes.  
In the final chapter, I discuss the broader implication of my research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE STATE SEPARATION OF POWER MODEL 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the differences in tort reform among the fifty 
states must be viewed as the end result of the interaction of the institutional context, 
political environment, and preference distribution of elite actors.  A separation of powers 
system of government produces a dynamic environment in which legislators and justices 
inter-dependently shape public policy and often act strategically rather than sincerely in 
order to maximize their individual utility.  Additionally, a federal system has produced a 
number of institutional differences among the fifty states that shape the behavior of these 
elite actors.  Furthermore, each state has a unique political environment in which factors 
such as public opinion, interest group preferences, party influence, and demographics 
influence the adoption of public policy.  Hence, a variety of different intra- and inter-
institutional features affect the relationship between the coordinate branches and in turn 
shape public policy.   
In this chapter, I identify the conditions under which legislatures and courts are 
constrained in the policy-making process.  Certain environments are expected to lead to 
increased strategic behavior by either the legislative or judicial branches.  I identify these 
conditions and further develop my theoretical argument through a simple game theoretic 
model that considers how the institutional structure and political environment affect the 
interaction between state courts and legislatures.    
  The State Separation of Powers (SSOP) model formalizes the interaction between 
legislators and courts within the state context.  Like all models, the SSOP model is a 
stylized representation and cannot capture the full complexity of the development of 
 
 
33 
 
public policies such as tort reform.   Throughout this chapter, I will explain how the 
model reflects real world conditions and how the simplified elements of the model might 
affect the hypotheses.  Though the game theoretic model necessarily simplifies reality, it 
is nonetheless an extremely attractive and effective tool in examining the inter-dependent 
relationship between courts and legislatures.  The model seeks to explain how individual 
decisions are interrelated and how these interrelated decisions result in particular 
outcomes.   Game theory acknowledges that an individual’s choices are influenced by 
their social setting and provides a means to “formalize social structure” allowing one to 
examine how the structure of the game affects individual decisions (Morrow 1994).   
Within this chapter, I use the SSOP model as a hypotheses building tool to make 
general predictions about when legislators and justices are expected to behave 
strategically.  By “formalizing” the institutional structure and political environment, I can 
derive hypotheses from the game’s equilibria that predict when certain outcomes will be 
achieved.  Additionally, I can see how the equilbria predictions differ when the 
institutional characteristics change.  The model’s equilibria might generate unexpected or 
even counterintuitive hypotheses, and may also serve as a “consistency check” in 
constructing a theory of state policymaking (Vanberg 2005).    
For instance, in Chapter I, I mentioned the Ohio Supreme Court case of State ex. 
Rel Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyer v. Sheward (1999) in which the Court struck down 
tort reform statute H.B. 350.   This decision was only one interaction among many 
between the state legislature and state supreme court in Ohio.  Prior to the enactment of 
H.B. 350 and the Sheward decision, the Ohio Supreme Court had struck down similar tort 
reform statutes enacted by the General Assembly.  And after the Sheward decision the 
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Court upheld another damage cap enacted by the legislature in the case of Arbino v. 
Johnson & Johnson (2007).    Taken as a whole, the behavior of the Ohio State Supreme 
Court and General Assembly seems puzzling.   A  number of very different outcomes 
were observed: a) the General Assembly willing to enact tort reform legislation (H.B. 
350) even though its previous attempts at reform had been rebuffed by the Court; b) the 
Court  striking down the entire statute in the Sheward case when it had previously struck 
down  similar legislation in a piecemeal fashion; c)  the General Assembly retaliating 
against the Court by enacting comprehensive tort reform legislation (S.B.80); d) and 
finally, the Court choosing to uphold the constitutionality of S.B 80 even though they 
declared similar statute unconstitutional in Sheward.   
Thus, even when considering how the tort reform movement has developed in a 
single state a number of different interactions between the court and legislature occur.  
We observe the legislature as an all powerful entity willing to enact legislation despite 
negative judicial review, the court willing to engage in an extended struggle with the 
legislature in pursuit of its policy goals, and finally, the court upholding the will of the 
legislature.   When looking at tort reform across all fifty states the different types of 
interactions multiply even further (recall Figures 1.1-1.3).  
  The strength of the SSOP game lies in its ability to explain these apparently 
dissimilar interactions using a single theoretical model.   While these different 
interactions are often treated as particular events that require individualized explanations, 
the SSOP model can incorporate them into a universal framework.  What once looked 
like puzzling or even contradictory behavior can be explained as rational behavior 
through the SSOP model (Marrow 1994, Vanberg 2005).  Hence, the purpose of creating 
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an SSOP model is to demarcate the dynamics of state policy-making rather than to 
explain the details of any one policy-making scenario. Such an approach is attractive 
because it generates hypotheses that are independent from the observed outcomes.  
Additionally, the model can make predictions regarding when different types of 
interactions between the coordinate branches are likely to occur.   
 In the sections to follow, the SSOP game is defined in terms of the sequence of 
events, the players, the information the players have when making decisions, and finally 
the payoffs the players receive when different outcomes are achieved.  The SSOP model 
utilizes a similar sequence of events and court types as Vanberg’s (2005) game but makes 
adaptations that better reflect policy making at the state level.   After the game is 
specified, a number of decision-making thresholds are defined that predict when the 
players are expected to pursue certain actions.  These decision-making thresholds lead to 
the game’s equilibria.  After discussing the game’s equilibria outcomes, I consider how 
the expected outcomes change when the institutional structure is varied.  I conclude by 
making some general observations that lead to the specific hypotheses tested in Chapters 
III-V.    
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The Sequence of Events and Environment Types 
 
Figure 2.1 The State Separation of Powers Model 
 
 
The players in the SSOP game are nature (N), a legislature (L), and a court (C).  I 
incorporate two conditions central to my analysis (the political environment and 
comparative elite ideology) into the model as moves by nature.  The game begins with 
nature making two moves.  In its initial move, nature determines the political 
environment.  In Chapter I, the political environment was broadly defined as a 
culmination of the different inter-institutional conditions in place when legislators and 
justices make their decisions and defined more specifically in the context of state tort 
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reform.  In the real world context of state policy-making different factors, such as public 
opinion and interest group activity, interact to create an environment that is to varying 
degrees either hostile or supportive of policy change.   However, to simplify the game, 
the political environment is defined in the model dichotomously as either hostile (H) to or 
supportive (S) of changing the status quo.  
I assume that both the court and the legislature have incomplete information 
regarding the political environment when making their moves.  This distinction most 
accurately captures the reality of state policy-making. The political environment 
encompasses a number of different factors and though some might have effects that are 
more transparent than others, we should not expect that courts and legislatures know with 
absolute certainty how these different factors will interact, and ultimately what type of 
environment they will produce.  For example, while a state legislature might have some 
idea that public opinion is supportive of tort reform and also that there are active interest 
groups opposed to tort reform, the legislators are ultimately unsure of whether not the 
anti-tort reform groups can successfully mobilize public opinion against the reforms.     
While we might think the court has a slight informational advantage as the second 
mover in the game, I assume that they too cannot know with certainty the nature of the 
political environment.  In reality the political environment is dynamic; issue salience, 
intensity of preferences, and resources can all fluctuate making a court less than certain 
about the political environment in which it is operating.  The uncertainty shared by the 
legislature and the court is captured through a probability reflecting each player’s 
subjective belief that the political environment is hostile captured by q ε (0, 1).  A high q 
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(close to 1) implies that both players are fairly certain the political environment is hostile, 
meaning that it is not conducive to changing the status quo.    
After determining whether the political environment is hostile or supportive, 
nature makes the second move of the game and determines the court’s type. Like the 
political environment, the court can be either hostile (H) or supportive (S) of the 
legislature’s policy preferences.  I assume the legislature wants to see the status quo 
changed.  Hence, a supportive court shares the policy preferences of the legislature and 
wants to see the status quo changed, while a hostile court does not share the policy 
preferences of the legislature and would prefer the status quo to any statute the legislature 
might enact.    
As discussed in Chapter I, the ideology of the court is expected to significantly 
influence its policy preferences; however, the model need not specify that ideology alone 
should account for the policy preferences of the court.  The court’s preferences regarding 
certain policies might also be influenced by legal or institutional factors.  In other words, 
while the model assumes that the court is policy-motivated, it does not assume that 
ideology is the sole motivator behind judicial preferences.   Demonstrated through the 
court’s payoffs and keeping with the underlying conceptualization of behavior within the 
model, the judicial actors are also constrained by extra-ideological factors.   
When choosing whether to enact a statute, the legislature is concerned with the 
court’s type.  If the court is supportive then the possibility of judicial review should pose 
little threat.  However if the court is hostile, the legislature will likely fear that the court 
will find an enacted statute unconstitutional.  But similar to the political environment, 
when choosing whether to enact a statute, it does not know with certainty which type of 
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court it must deal with. In the context of state policy-making, the policy preferences of 
the court are not always transparent.  Certain contextual factors may foster transparency 
while others do not.  For example, while some states have mechanisms that allow for 
increased communication between the state legislature and courts (such as advisory 
opinions) others do not.  As a result, state legislatures should not be assumed to have 
complete information regarding the preferences of the state supreme courts.  This 
additional source of uncertainty for the legislature is captured by the probability p ε (0, 
1).   A high p (close to 1) implies that the legislature is fairly certain that it is dealing with 
a hostile court.     
In summary, by the time the legislature makes its initial move, it faces two 
sources of uncertainty: the political environment and court type.   When choosing 
whether to enact a statute (E) or not (~E) the legislature can be in any one of four 
environment types.    These four environment types are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Environment Types 
Environment Description 
I. Supportive/ Supportive The Court and the political environment 
support changing the status quo. 
II. Supportive/ Hostile The Court favors changing the status quo 
but the political environment does not. 
III.   Hostile/ Supportive The Court opposes changing the status quo 
but the political environment is supportive. 
IV.   Hostile/Hostile The Court and the political environment 
oppose changing the status quo.   
  
 
If the legislature chooses not to enact then the game ends and the status quo 
outcome is achieved.  However, if the legislature does enact then the court has the next 
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move.   The court can choose between three moves: it can avoid reviewing the statute 
(A), uphold the statute (C), or find the statute unconstitutional (UC). This tripartite choice 
takes into account the importance of the agenda-setting stage of judicial decision-making. 
Instead of forcing the court to make a decision on the merits, the agenda-setting stage is 
incorporated into the model, allowing the court the additional option of refusing to review 
the statute in question. Langer (2002) and Brace, Hall, and Langer (1999) have shown 
that the potential for strategic behavior is not limited to the decision-on-the-merits stage 
of judicial decision making.   
The presence of a discretionary docket is thus an important source of institutional 
variation that may affect the behavior of state supreme court justices; in courts with 
discretionary dockets, justices can choose cases that serve as the best vehicles for moving 
public policy in their desired direction or can avoid taking a case if they fear retaliation 
by the legislature.1   The importance of this institutional characteristic will become clear 
towards the end of the chapter when I discuss the equilibria outcomes and how they 
change when the court is forced to rule on the merits.   
If the court chooses to avoid a case or find the statute constitutional then the game 
ends with the legislature successfully enacting its preferences into law.  However, if the 
court finds the enacted statute unconstitutional then the legislature is given the final move 
of the game.  At this final stage, the legislature chooses either to retaliate (R) against the 
court or do nothing (~R).  Though retaliation might come in a number of different forms, 
I assume that when the legislature retaliates it is able to reinstate its policy preferences.  
                                                           
1 Thirteen states have discretionary jurisdiction over civil appeals, nineteen have mandatory jurisdiction, 
and eighteen have a combination, mandatory jurisdiction of some civil appeals and discretionary 
jurisdiction over others (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998).  
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This may occur by enacting another statute, or by a constitutional amendment reversing 
the decision of the court.  If the legislature does not retaliate, then the court has 
successfully replaced the policy preferences of the legislature with its own preferences.     
 
The Player’s Payoff Components 
Before we can consider the player’s strategy profiles, their payoff components 
must be specified.   The different payoff components received by the legislature and the 
court are summarized in Table 2.2.   
 
Table 2.2 SSOP Player’s Payoff Components 
 
 
The Court’s payoffs are a function of three components: policy preference, public 
opinion, and institutional concerns.  I assume the court has a preference for the policy 
under review captured by the policy payoff A>0.  The court achieves the payoff A 
anytime the final outcome of the game is consistent with its policy preferences.  Because 
Court Defined As: Occurs When: 
A Policy payoff Final Outcome is Consistent with Court’s Policy 
Preference 
I Institutional 
Cost 
Court is Retaliated Against or Takes a Position Against 
its Policy Preference 
C Public Opinion 
Cost 
Court Opposes Public Opinion through Action 
Legislature Defined As: Occurs When: 
α Policy payoff Final Outcome is Consistent with Legislature’s Policy 
Preference 
β Political Cost Legislature Goes Against the Preferences of the Broader 
Political Environment through Action. 
ε Legislating Cost  Legislature Enacts a Statute or Retaliates Against the 
Court.  
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a supportive court shares the same policy preferences as the legislature, it receives the 
payoff A anytime a statute is successfully enacted.  A hostile court, on the other hand, 
receives the policy payoff A when it can successful replace the legislature’s policy with 
its own by declaring the statute unconstitutional.   
Again, given all the different inter- and intra-institutional constraints faced by 
state supreme court justices, it would be naive to assume that justices are only motivated 
by policy preferences.  As discussed in Chapter I, method of selection and retention is 
another important source of institutional variation that might affect judicial decision-
making.  Because a majority of state supreme court justices face some type of election in 
the course of their career, I assume that justices have electorally-motivated concerns, and 
like their legislative peers must also be concerned with public opinion.   Thus, the court 
pays a cost c>0 for opposing public opinion through action.  I assume this cost only 
occurs when the political environment is opposed to the action taken by the court.  
Though the political environment encompasses more than simply public opinion, the 
overall context of the political environment shapes public opinion in a substantial way.  
Recall the discussion about the political environment regarding tort reform.      
Additionally, I assume that the court is sensitive to its institutional position vis a 
vis the legislature and seeks to avoid both retaliation and having to support the legislature 
when its own policy preferences diverge.  While retaliation naturally calls into question 
the court’s institutional position, I argue that feeling that it has to support the legislature 
when the two are actually opposed is equally damaging to the court’s institutional 
position.  When doing so, the court concedes to the will of the legislature. Hence, while 
the legislature might deal the court a blow through retaliation, the court sets itself back 
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when it succumbs to the legislative will. Hence, the court pays a cost I>0 if the legislature 
retaliates or if it upholds a statute with which it disagrees. 
The legislature’s payoffs, like the court’s, include both political and policy-
motivated components.  The legislature receives a payoff α>0 if it successfully 
implements its desired policy either because the court complies or because the legislature 
retaliates.  The legislature must pay a public opinion cost β>0 when its actions are in 
conflict with the political environment.  As with the court, I assume that the legislature 
will only pay this cost when it goes against the political environment because this cost 
reflects the ability of the overall political environment to shape public opinion and affect 
the legislature’s political success.   Additionally the legislature pays a cost α>ε>0 for both 
legislating and retaliating.  This cost captures the fact that legislating can be costly due to 
time constraints, competing issues, and the difficulty in obtaining a legislative majority.   
The payoffs received by each player for each outcome are summarized in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 SSOP Possible Outcomes 
 
Court 
Preferences 
S or H 
Political 
Environment 
S or H 
E or ~E A, C, or 
UC 
R or ~R Legislature’s 
Payoff 
Court’s 
Payoff 
Environment I  (1-p, 1-q) 
S S ~E   0 0 
S S E A  α –ε A 
S S E C  α –ε A 
S S E UC R α - 2ε A-2I-c 
S S E UC ~R -ε -I-c 
Environment II (1-p, q) 
S H ~E   0 0 
S H E A  α – β -ε A 
S H E C  α – β –ε A-c 
S H E UC R α – 2β -2ε A-2I 
S H E UC ~R -β- ε -I 
Environment III (p, 1-q) 
H S ~E   0 A 
H S E A  α –ε 0 
H S E C  α –ε -I 
H S E UC R α -2ε -I-c 
H S E UC ~R -ε A-c 
Environment IV (p, q) 
H H ~E   0 A 
H H E A  α – β -ε 0 
H H E C  α – β –ε -I-c 
H H E UC R α – 2β -2ε -I 
H H E UC ~R -β-ε A 
  
 
The Decision-Making Thresholds 
The predictions of the SSOP model demonstrate that state policy-making is the 
end result of the interaction between elite preferences, political environment, and 
institutional structure. Not surprisingly, policy implementation is expected to occur most 
readily in a supportive political environment with shared elite preferences.  However, 
when one of these conditions does not hold the predictions of the model vary.  The 
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greater the probability that the political environment and the court are supportive (q=1, 
and p=1, respectively), the more likely it is that the legislature will be able to implement 
the policy of its choosing.  Following Vanberg (2005), I discuss the predictions of the 
model in terms of decision-making thresholds and I limit my attention to pure strategies.  
The proofs behind the different thresholds can be found in the Chapter’s Appendix A. 
 
The Retaliation Threshold 
 Using backward induction, I start at the end of the game by first defining the 
Legislature’s Retaliation Threshold: 
Retaliate iff q<ε-α/β 
At this stage of the game, the legislature knows that it is dealing with a hostile court 
because a supportive court would never find the enacted statute unconstitutional (A>A-
2I, A>-I, A>A-2I-c, A>-I-c).   However, the legislature is still uncertain about the 
political environment type.   While the decision to retaliate allows the legislature to 
implement its desired policy, it can also lead to public backlash against the legislature 
when the environment is hostile.  Therefore, whether the legislature decides to retaliate is 
based on its expectations about the likelihood of each scenario.  When the probability that 
the political environment is hostile (q) rises above a certain threshold, the legislature 
decides that retaliation is too costly.  As the legislature is increasingly convinced that it is 
operating within a hostile political environment it becomes less likely to retaliate against 
the court. 
Additionally, the Retaliation Threshold depends upon three critical factors: policy 
preferences, the cost of public backlash, and the cost of enacting.  As the legislature’s 
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policy preference over the issue (α) increases, the threshold also increases, meaning that 
the legislature is more likely to retaliate.  As the cost of public backlash (β) increases, the 
legislature is increasingly less likely to enact because the threshold under which the 
legislature will choose to retaliate narrows.   And as the cost of legislating increases, the 
threshold decreases as well.    In summary, the legislature’s decision whether to retaliate 
depends upon its beliefs concerning the political environment type, the intensity of its 
own policy preferences, the cost of public backlash, and the cost of enacting new 
legislation.   
 
The Avoidance Threshold 
 Next, the Avoidance Threshold defines the supportive court’s decision between 
finding a statute constitutional and avoiding the issue by not accepting the case.  I assume 
that if a supportive court is indifferent between finding a statute constitutional and 
avoiding a case, it will choose to find the case constitutional.  This tie-breaking option 
reflects the value justices find in taking part in the policy-making process.  By accepting 
the case, the court has the opportunity to impose its own policy preferences directly into 
law.  However, due to the potential cost imposed for opposing public opinion, avoiding 
the case weakly dominates finding the statute constitutional.     When the court chooses to 
avoid the case they receive a payoff of A, while when accepting the case and upholding 
the statute the court can receive a payoff of either A or A-c.   Hence the Judicial 
Avoidance Threshold is: 
Find Constitutional iff –cq=0 
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 The supportive court should only rule on the merits if either c or q is equal to 
zero, meaning that either there is no public opinion cost or it is absolutely certain that the 
political environment is supportive.  This threshold necessarily raises a question: Why do 
we witness justices taking and upholding cases? The possible answers to this question 
demonstrate the importance of taking into account the institutional structures within each 
state.   When considering institutional differences the decision to take a case is not as 
unlikely as it may seem when looking at the threshold alone. First, the method of 
selection and retention matters.   We might expect c to equal zero for a court that does not 
face competitive elections.  Later in the chapter, I will discuss in detail how the game 
changes when there is no public opinion cost for the court (c=0).  Additionally, there 
might be circumstances in which the political environment is transparent and the court 
can be confident that it is acting within a supportive political environment (q=0).  Finally, 
as discussed previously, the court’s ability to control its docket affects judicial decision-
making.  In the real-world context of state policy-making, avoidance is not always an 
option because some courts have mandatory rather than discretionary dockets. Later in 
the chapter, I will discuss how the game changes when the avoidance option is removed.    
 
 The Judicial Veto Threshold 
 The Judicial Veto Threshold defines the parameters in which a hostile court will 
choose to find a statute unconstitutional rather than avoid the case.   Finding the statute 
constitutional is never a pure strategy for the hostile court.  The expected utility received 
for avoiding (0) is greater than the utility received when finding the statute constitutional 
regardless of the political environment.  Additionally, when the legislature can retaliate 
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against the court, avoidance is always preferred to finding the statute unconstitutional 
(0>-I>-I-c).  Hence, the Judicial Veto threshold defines the conditions under which a 
court will find the statute unconstitutional when the legislature cannot retaliate: 
Find Unconstitutional iff q<c-A/c 
 The equation suggests that the threshold in which the court should choose 
Unconstitutional over Avoid is fairly broad when it knows the legislature cannot retaliate.  
The court’s decision is a function of the strength of its own policy preferences and the 
expected public opinion cost.  The court should only choose to avoid when the 
probability of a hostile environment is low and the public opinion cost is higher than the 
policy gain.   And as the intensity of its policy preference increases, the court should be 
more likely to find the statute unconstitutional.    
 
 The Legislative Enactment Threshold 
 At the initial stage of the game, the legislature faces two sources of incomplete 
information and can be in any one of four decision-making environments.    When 
choosing whether to enact a statute, the legislature must consider “pq”, the joint 
probability that the court and political environment are hostile.  In the first case (Case I), I 
define the Legislative Enactment Threshold when the Judicial Veto Threshold has not 
been met (q>c-A/c). Under these circumstances, the Legislative Enactment Threshold is: 
Enact iff q<α-ε/-β 
  The Legislative Enactment Threshold is a function of three factors, policy 
preference, the cost of legislating, and cost of public backlash.  As the probability that the 
environment is hostile increases, the threshold in which the legislature will enact narrows.  
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As the legislature’s policy preferences intensify the threshold increases.   And finally, as 
both the cost of legislating and the cost of public backlash increase, the threshold 
becomes smaller.  Interestingly, we see that the legislature does not directly take into 
account the court type when legislating within this scenario, as p has dropped from the 
equation.   
 The Legislative Enactment Threshold is defined primarily by the nature of the 
political environment.  As long as q falls below a certain level, the legislature recognizes 
that court’s judicial veto threshold has not been met and that its Legislative Enactment 
Threshold has been met (c-A/c<q<α-ε/β).  Instead of having a direct effect, the effect of 
judicial ideology on legislative decision-making is conditioned by the political 
environment.  The legislature’s beliefs about the nature of the political environment 
influence both its perception of its own strength and the strength of the court.     
 This same dynamic is in place when considering the legislature’s decision 
whether to enact under a second scenario (Case II) in which the court will veto and the 
legislature cannot retaliate (ε-α/β<q<c-A/c).  In Case II, the decision not to enact strictly 
dominates the decision to enact (0>-ε>-β-ε).   When q reaches a certain threshold, the 
legislature knows that the court can veto and it cannot retaliate without incurring the cost 
of public backlash. Under this scenario, the legislature chooses not to enact legislation.  
Again, the political environment defines the legislature’s and court’s decision-making 
calculus.   
 In the third scenario (Case III), the probability the environment is hostile is less 
than both the Judicial Veto Threshold and Retaliation Threshold (q<c-A/c and ε-α/-β), 
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meaning that the court will veto and the legislature will retaliate.  Under Case III, the 
legislature’s decision is defined by: 
Enact iff q<α-2ε/2β 
 This threshold encompasses the same factors as the threshold defined in Case I, 
while taking into account the additional cost of retaliating and the threat of incurring the 
cost of public backlash not once but twice.   When the legislature believes that the 
Judicial Veto Threshold has been met for the hostile court, the Enactment Threshold is 
smaller than the threshold defined in Case I in which the court will not veto.  Once again 
the relationship between the court and the legislature is conditioned by the nature of the 
political environment.   The legislature is willing to accept judicial veto as long as its 
beliefs about the political environment suggest that retaliating will be less costly than not 
seeing its policy preferences become law.     
 
The Equilibria Predictions 
 There are two different types of equilibrium interactions predicted by the SSOP 
model, in one the legislature is constrained, and in the other, the legislature prevails.  The 
Constrained Legislature Equilibrium is defined as: 
I. Legislature (~Enact, ~Retaliate) 
    Court (Hostile/Unconstitutional, Supportive/Avoid) 
In this equilibrium, the Retaliation Threshold has not been met for the legislature.  
Knowing this, a hostile court will veto as long as q<c-A/c.  And if the Judicial Veto 
Threshold has been met for the hostile court a supportive court will always avoid (q≠0).   
This equilibrium predicts that no statute will be enacted because a legislature will never 
enact when a hostile court can veto and it cannot retaliate (Case II).  In this equilibrium 
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we see that the players’ beliefs about the political environment drive their decision-
making.  The effect of the judicial branch on legislative behavior is conditioned by its 
beliefs about the political environment type.  In this equilibrium, the legislature acts 
strategically by censoring its own behavior in light of the anticipated behavior of the 
court.  This outcome has been referred to as “autolimitation”, the “passive influence”, or 
the “preemptive power” of judicial review (Brace and Hall 2001, Langer, Brace, and Hall 
2005, Vanberg 2005) in which the mere threat of judicial review keeps the legislature 
from enacting.   
This equilibrium prediction demonstrates that the preemptive power of judicial 
review only occurs when the political environment is opposed to the legislative agenda.  
While the legislature does take into account the preferences of the court, the influence is 
indirect.  The legislature’s beliefs regarding the political environment define its beliefs 
regarding the future moves made by the court.  The legislature is willing to oppose a 
hostile court as long as the political environment is supportive.  The game predicts two 
such equilbria in which the legislature is able to enact a statute successfully.  The 
Legislature Prevails Equilibria are defined as: 
II. Legislature (Enact, Retaliate) 
     Court (Hostile/Avoid, Supportive/Avoid) 
 
III. Legislature (Enact, Retaliate) 
      Court (Hostile/Avoid, Supportive/Constitutional) 
 
 In these equilbria, the Retaliation Threshold has been met for the legislature.   
When the Retaliation Threshold has been met, a hostile court will always avoid and a 
supportive court will either avoid or find the statute constitutional if it is certain the 
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environment is supportive.  Hence in these equilibria, a legislature enacts a statute and the 
court accepts the statute regardless of its type. 
 
Changing the Institutional Structure 
 
 Scenario 1:  Mandatory Docket 
As mentioned earlier, many state supreme courts do not have complete control 
over their dockets.   Sometimes state supreme courts are forced to rule on the merits 
because they do not have the option of avoiding.   When the avoidance option is removed 
from the SSOP game the decision-making thresholds change and the equilibrium 
predictions vary.    When the court has a mandatory docket, a supportive court will 
always find the statute constitutional; the decision to find the statute constitutional 
weakly dominates finding the statute unconstitutional.     
 In the original SSOP game, the hostile court will always avoid when it knows the 
legislature will retaliate.  However, when forced to choose between finding a statute 
unconstitutional and constitutional, the hostile court will find the statute unconstitutional 
if q>1/2 even when the legislature will retaliate.  Hence, unlike in the original version of 
the game, there can be an equilibrium outcome in which the legislature enacts, the court 
finds unconstitutional, and the legislature retaliates.  Also, when the avoidance option is 
removed, the likelihood of a hostile court choosing to find unconstitutional when the 
legislature cannot retaliate is extremely high.   The only time a hostile court will uphold 
the statute is if it is fairly certain it is in a supportive environment and the cost of public 
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backlash is very high.  In summary, having a mandatory rather than discretionary docket 
increases the likelihood of a hostile court finding a statute unconstitutional.   
 
Scenario 2: No Public Opinion Cost 
 While the SSOP game includes a public opinion cost for justices, in the reality of 
state policy-making there are a variety of scenarios in which c might actual equal zero. 
For instance, while a majority of state supreme court justices face reelection at some 
point in their careers, others do not.  Some justices are reappointed and others face 
uncompetitive retention elections in which justices are very rarely unseated. Under these 
circumstances, we should not expect the justices to pay a public opinion cost.  
Additionally, as justices approach retirement there is no reason to believe they should still 
be concerned with public opinion.  Hence, to capture the reality of state policy-making 
we must consider how the decision-making thresholds of the game change when the court 
is less concerned with public opinion.   
 When there is no public opinion cost, a supportive court will always find a statute 
constitutional rather than avoid taking a case.  When the legislature can retaliate, a hostile 
court will still always choose to avoid the case rather than find the statute 
unconstitutional. However, when the legislature cannot retaliate, a hostile court will 
always find the statute unconstitutional (A>0). Hence, the absence of a public opinion 
cost also increases the likelihood that a hostile court will find a statute unconstitutional.   
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 Scenario 3:  Mandatory Docket and No Public Opinion Cost 
In the third and final scenario, the court has a mandatory docket and has no public 
opinion cost.  Again, under this set of circumstances a supportive court will always find a 
statute constitutional and the hostile court will always strike the statute down when the 
legislature cannot retaliate.  Additionally, under this scenario a hostile court is indifferent 
between finding a statute constitutional and unconstitutional when the legislature can 
retaliate.  Regardless of the political environment, the hostile court receives the same 
payoff for finding the statute constitutional and finding the statute unconstitutional and 
being retaliated against.  Thus, under this scenario there is an equilibrium outcome in 
which the legislature enacts, the court finds that statute unconstitutional, and the 
legislature retaliates.   
 When changes are made to the institutional structure of the SSOP model, the 
decision-making behavior of the elite actors also changes. When a legislature chooses to 
enact legislation, it should be aware that the likelihood of a hostile court finding a statute 
unconstitutional is highest when the court has a mandatory docket and is not concerned 
with public opinion.  Hence, under these circumstances, the legislature must be 
increasingly confident that it can successfully retaliate if it believes the court is hostile.  
While retaliation was never a Bayesian equilibrium outcome in the original SSOP game, 
it becomes one when the court cannot choose to avoid the issue.  Additionally, the 
likelihood of this outcome increases when the court does not pay a public opinion cost.   
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General Observations 
The predictions generated from the SSOP model have led me to a number of 
general observations that translate into the specific hypotheses tested in Chapters III-V:   
 
Observation 1:  
 
  Courts and legislatures behave strategically in relation to one another.   Justices 
and legislators behave strategically by acting contrary to their sincere preferences in the 
short term in order to maximize their policy objectives in the long run (Epstein and 
Knight 1998). They do so because they anticipate the likely reactions of other players in 
the SSOP game.  Indeed, the formal model assumes that the actors’ choices are 
conditioned upon their expectations regarding the next player’s move in the game. When 
the policy preferences of the justices and legislators diverge, each has more to fear 
regarding retribution from the other.   For the court, this relationship is fairly straight-
forward.  Retaliation is very costly for the court.  If the court anticipates that the 
legislature can retaliate it will avoid ruling against the legislature under almost all 
circumstances instead of following its sincere preferences.   
 For the legislature, the decision between acting sincerely and strategically is 
indirectly dependent on the preferences of the court.  If a legislature believes that a court 
is likely to veto an enacted statute it must consider whether or not it can retaliate, based 
on its expectations concerning the political environment. If the political environment does 
not favor the legislature and the court will veto, the legislature acts strategically by 
censoring its own behavior.  Hence, in certain circumstances, both legislators and justices 
may fear retribution enough to pursue actions that are inconsistent with their own policy 
preferences.  The game’s equilibria clearly show this type of strategic behavior.   In the 
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Constrained Legislature Equilibrium, the legislature chooses not to enact because it 
cannot retaliate against a hostile court.  In the Legislature Prevails Equilibria, the hostile 
court acts strategically by avoiding ruling on a statute rather than finding it 
unconstitutional because it expects the legislature to retaliate.  The equilibria predictions 
demonstrate that the coordinate branches’ ability to see their policy preferences become 
law are dependent upon the policy preferences of one another and the nature of the 
political environment.   
 
Observation 2:   
 The political environment and public opinion have both a direct and indirect 
effect on the behavior of legislators and justices. The nature of the political environment 
defines the thresholds under which the legislature and court are expected to pursue 
certain courses of action.  The political environment signals to legislators and justices 
whether or not they should expect to pay a public opinion cost.   As the games 
equilibrium predictions demonstrate, public opinion matters.  It matters both to legislators 
and justices and it matters to justices more or less depending on their method of 
selection/retention.    
The equilibrium predictions of the model demonstrate that the nature of the 
political environment is a more salient predictor of legislative behavior than the policy 
preferences of the court. When a legislature is confident that the political environment is 
supportive of changing the status quo, it will enact legislation regardless of the 
preferences of the court.  Recall, that the Legislative Enactment Threshold did not 
include p, the probability that the court is hostile.  As long as the political environment 
favors the legislature, it does not have to worry about the preferences of the court. Hence, 
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differences in policy preference between the legislature and court are only expected to 
affect legislative behavior when the political environment is not supportive of the 
legislative agenda.  This interesting observation has gone untested in previous studies of 
state policy-making.  While others have considered how the difference between 
legislative, judicial, and citizen preferences affect the enactment of public policy, a 
conditional relationship as seen through the SSOP game has not been empirically tested 
(Brace, Langer, and Hall 2005).   
The SSOP model clearly demonstrates that the political environment and the cost 
of opposing public opinion have both a direct and indirect effect on the behavior of 
legislators. While the political environment is crucial to the legislature’s decision-making 
calculus, the nature of the political environment also provides an additional informational 
component about the strength of court.  When a legislature knows that a court does not 
care about public opinion, it in turn knows that the court will be more likely to find the 
statute unconstitutional if it is hostile.  Hence, a legislature will have to be confident that 
it has enough public support to retaliate.    
This same type of relationship holds for the court as well.  While elected justices 
are expected to care directly about public opinion, all justices look to the political 
environment as an indicator of the strength of the legislative branch.    When the court 
suspects that the political environment is at odds with the legislatures’ sincere policy 
preferences, it is more emboldened to act.  Hence, when salient issues are at stake, public 
opinion can act as a direct and indirect constraint on legislators and justices by providing 
cues about when electoral and inter-branch retaliation is likely to occur.                                                      
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Observation 3:   
The institutional structure of the state court system affects both judicial and 
legislative decision-making.  As the institutional characteristics of the SSOP game were 
varied the decision-making thresholds and the game’s equilibria predictions changed, 
proving that institutional structure significantly influences elite decision-making.   As 
discussed in Chapter I, we now see through the SSOP game specifically how the 
institutional structure defines the relationship between the branches and also their ties to 
the broader political environment. 
Discretion in a court’s docket is one important institutional difference that affects 
state policy-making.   The game’s equilibria demonstrate that the ability to avoid cases 
allows the state supreme court to avoid ever paying an institutional cost.  When a court 
has the option to avoid, it can always avoid being retaliated against.  Additionally, it can 
avoid having to outwardly support a statute in which it disagrees.  However, when state 
supreme courts have mandatory dockets and are forced to rule on the merits, supportive 
courts are more likely to uphold statutes, and hostile courts are more likely to strike down 
statutes.   Thus, docket control influences the behavior of the legislature as well.   If a 
state legislature believes that a state supreme court with a mandatory docket has 
divergent policy preferences, it must be confident that it has enough public support to 
retaliate.    
Differences in selection method affect the behavior of state supreme court justices 
and legislators in the same way.  When justices are not held accountable to an electorate 
they are more likely to pursue their sincere preferences.  Justices are more likely to 
uphold statutes when they support changing the status quo, and are more likely to strike 
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down statutes when they are against changing the status quo.  When a court has a 
mandatory docket, is not held accountable to public opinion, and has policy preferences 
divorced from legislative preferences, it is more likely to find a legislative enactment 
unconstitutional.   
 
Conclusion 
 The SSOP model demonstrates formally how the interaction of elite preferences, 
political environment, and institutional structure influence state public policy.  The SSOP 
model and the broader theoretical arguments involved have many empirical implications 
that can be tested in the context of state tort reform. The observations drawn from the 
model will be used to construct specific hypotheses tested in the following chapters. The 
SSOP model has made a number of theoretical contributions to the study of state policy-
making.  First, the model has identified the conditions under which state legislatures and 
courts should pursue certain courses of action.  As noted in the beginning of the chapter, 
the results of the formal model can help to explain elite behavior that previously seemed 
particularistic or even sporadic.  For instance, in the case of Ohio, the formal model helps 
to explain why under certain circumstances the General Assembly prevailed against the 
Court and why under different circumstances it did not.  
  Additionally, the model can explain how the different institutional structures 
across the fifty states have contributed to the vast differences among state tort reforms. 
Finally, the SSOP model has led to a unique observation that has not been previously 
tested.  The model suggests that the relationship between legislative and judicial 
preferences is indirect.  Legislatures look primarily to the political environment to assess 
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their strength.  As long as they are confident that the political environment is conducive 
to pursuing their policy goals, legislatures do not have to be concerned with the 
preferences of the court.  Hence, the relationship between legislative behavior and 
judicial preferences is conditional.  This particular relationship and the overall strength of 
the formal model in explaining state elite decision-making will be substantiated by the 
empirical tests in the chapters to follow.  Chapter III considers the state legislatures’ 
decisions whether to enact tort reform legislation.      
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT STAGE 
In the previous chapter, I developed a state separation of powers model that 
identified the conditions under which both legislators and justices are expected to be 
constrained in the policy-making process.  Two central theoretical components were 
incorporated into the SSOP model as moves by nature: comparative elite ideology and 
the political environment.  Hence, the game’s equilibria outcomes and decision-making 
thresholds can be examined to make predictions about the likely effect of both the 
political environment and the preferences of the coordinate branches at each stage in the 
decision-making process, beginning with the legislature’s decision to enact.   
The SSOP model acknowledges that courts may not only play a reactionary role 
in the political process, but may play an active role as well by influencing legislative 
decisions to enact statutes.  Scholars have just recently begun to consider state supreme 
courts as active players in the policy-making arena and there is already some evidence 
that courts preemptively shape public policy through the mere threat of overturning a 
statute (Langer and Brace 2005; Wilhelm 2005; Stiles and Bowen 2007).  In Chapter I, I 
discussed how Langer and Brace (2005) modeled a legislature’s decision to enact public 
policy as a game between state supreme courts and legislatures. The authors found some 
evidence supporting the “passive influence” of judicial review, finding that court 
ideology affected the likelihood of enactment of abortion and death penalty statutes.  
Additionally, Wilhelm (2005) found that court preferences and the likelihood of 
intervention affected the enactment of education policy.   
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The SSOP model I developed in Chapter II, allows me to theoretically build on 
the previous work done by Langer and Brace (2005) and Wilhelm (2005).  The SSOP 
model not only recognizes that a court may have preemptive power over the enactment of 
legislation, but further refines the conditions under which a state supreme court is 
expected to constrain a state legislature.  At the legislative enactment stage, the SSOP 
model suggests that a conditional relationship exists between the political environment 
and court preferences.  When the legislature is choosing whether to enact a statute it faces 
two sources of incomplete information: the court type and the political environment type.   
The enactment decision-making threshold, however, only directly reflects the salience of 
the political environment. As long as the probability that the political environment is 
supportive reaches a certain threshold, the court type becomes irrelevant to the decision-
making calculus of the legislature (when q< α-2ε/2β).   When this threshold is met, the 
legislature can enact a statute regardless of the preferences of the court because it has the 
political capital to retaliate against the court if necessary.   
If this threshold has not been met, however, the preferences of the court become a 
critical component in the legislature’s decision whether to enact a statute.  When the 
probability the environment is hostile lies somewhere between α-2ε/2β and α-ε/-β, the 
legislature can enact legislation but does not have the public support needed to retaliate 
against a hostile court.   Under these circumstances, the preferences of the court become 
extremely important to legislative decision-making, because a legislature will never enact 
a statute when it cannot retaliate against a hostile court.  Hence, the model predicts a 
conditional relationship between the political environment and court preferences.  When 
the legislature is fairly certain the political environment is supportive, the preferences of 
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the court have no effect on its decision to enact.  When the political environment is less 
supportive or ambiguous, court preferences will have a salient effect on legislative 
decision-making, with court hostility decreasing the likelihood of enactment. 
Within this chapter, I examine the conditional effect of judicial preferences on 
legislative decision-making in the context of state tort reform.  The key to successfully 
analyzing this relationship lies in defining the political environment.  In the first chapter, 
I discussed the nature of the political environment regarding tort reform.    I argued that 
the campaign for tort reform has been elite-driven and that the media and interest groups 
have worked together to create a political environment that has become increasingly 
supportive of tort reform.   I discussed how this pro-reform climate was created over time 
and also how the tort reform movement has varied from state to state.   
This substantial variation across time and amongst the fifty states allows me to 
empirically test the conditional relationship between a state’s political environment and 
judicial preferences.  Additionally, beyond the interactive effect between the political 
environment and court preferences, I expect a number of other variables will affect a 
legislature’s decision whether or not to enact tort reform legislation.   I elaborate upon the 
conditional relationship and the factors expected to affect legislative decision-making in 
the proceeding section.   
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   Hypotheses 
 
The Political Environment and Judicial Preferences  
When a legislature has a significant level of support from the broader political 
environment, it need not take into account judicial preferences when choosing whether or 
not to enact legislation.  When the political environment is supportive of reform, the 
legislature does not need to take into account the likely actions of the court because it has 
the political capital to retaliate against a hostile court if necessary.  As I argued in the first 
chapter, the overall environment has become increasingly supportive of tort reform due to 
a variety of different factors; however, the level of support for reform varies across states 
and across time.   
Following from the work of Daniels and Martin (1995), Haltom and McCann 
(2004) and Zaller (1992), I argue that support for tort reform is best conceptualized by 
considering interest group activity, media bias, and the political predispositions of a 
state’s citizenry.    The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), formed in 1986, is 
arguably the most influential and far-reaching pro-reform interest group due to its success 
in infiltrating the mass media (Daniels and Martin 1995, Haltom and McCann 2004).  
Since the founding of the ATRA, the political environment has been more conducive to 
tort reform and in turn state legislatures have been increasingly able to rely on public 
support of tort reform. Hence, I hypothesize, 
H1:  State legislatures should be more likely to enact tort reform legislation after the 
founding of the ATRA. 
Additionally, the mass media has been a key player in influencing public opinion 
regarding tort reform.  Through selective news coverage and the use of tort tales, the 
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media has led the mass public to believe that the majority of civil suits are frivolous, jury 
verdicts are out of control, and that they are the ultimate victims of a litigatious society.   
Public support for tort reform can be generated by elites when citizens perceive a 
problem with the existing system.  Thus, 
H2:  State legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation when there is 
negative news coverage of civil litigation.     
 Citizens’ political predispositions are expected to affect how they react to the pro-
reform message espoused by the both the ATRA and the mass media.  Mass public 
opinion is influenced by both the extent of exposure to elite discourse on the issue and the 
political predispositions of the citizenry (Zaller 1992).  Conservative citizens should be 
more likely to accept the pro-reform message because of the emphasis on personal 
responsibility and individualism.  Hence, 
H3: State legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation in states in which the 
citizens are conservative.    
  When the ATRA is active, pro-reform media coverage is present, and citizens are 
conservative, legislatures should be sufficiently confident that they have the public 
support necessary to enact tort reform legislation.  In summary, 
H4:  State legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation when the political 
environment is supportive.  
 
 When the political environment is supportive, a state legislature does not need to 
directly take into account the preferences of the judicial branch.  The legislature has 
enough political capital to enact tort reform legislation regardless of its expectations 
about the likely action of the judicial branch.  However, when a legislature cannot count 
on the mobilization of sufficient public support, a legislature must be sensitive to judicial 
preferences.  Retaliation against the court can be very costly. As the formal model 
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demonstrates, retaliation involves both the time and effort of enacting new legislation or 
passing a constitutional amendment.  Additionally, retaliation involves the threat of 
incurring public backlash.  Courts in the United States derive considerable political 
capital from their perceived institutional legitimacy (Calderia and Gibson 1992, Gibson 
and Baird 1997) and the mass public expresses more diffuse support of the judicial 
branch than the legislative branch (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).  Hence, in 
considering retaliation against a court, a legislature must be confident that it can rely on 
the public for support.   
 If a state legislature does not have a sufficient level of public support to make 
retaliation less costly, than the legislature must take into account the preferences of the 
court when choosing whether to enact.  As expressed in the SSOP model, both policy and 
institutionally motivated concerns are expected to influence court preferences. The 
interaction between policy and institutionally motivated concerns is expected to be 
especially salient concerning tort reform.  Previous studies demonstrating the preemptive 
power of state supreme courts have focused on ideologically cohesive issues such as 
abortion and death penalty law (Langer and Brace 2005).  In these areas of law it is clear 
why judicial ideology is viewed as the most salient predictor of the court’s decision 
whether to overturn a statute.  The motivations behind court preferences regarding tort 
reform are not as overt.   
Support for tort reform is usually considered a conservative issue position because 
tort reform statutes are primarily written to limit the ability of plaintiffs to collect 
damages.  However, the tort reform movement is also described as a “turf war” in which 
justices seek to keep tort law under their jurisdiction (Schwartz, Behrens, and Taylor 
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1997).   Hence, while I expect liberal courts will be more hostile to tort reform, I expect 
that professional courts will be more hostile as well.  More professional courts are more 
likely to be offended by legislative encroachment into their “turf” and are also more 
likely to have the resources necessary to challenge the legislature.   Court hostility, as 
expressed in terms of both liberalism and professionalism, should influence a 
legislature’s decision at the enactment stage when the political environment is not 
supportive of tort reform.    
H5: When the political environment is not supportive, court hostility should decrease the 
likelihood of enactment.  
 
 
Legislative and Gubernatorial Preferences 
 As discussed in Chapter I, legislators pursue policy-minded goals. The Enactment 
Threshold of the SSOP game demonstrated that as the intensity of a legislature’s policy 
preferences increased, the threshold in which it would choose to enact widened.   When 
behaving sincerely, conservative legislatures are expected to favor tort reform. Thus, 
H6:  Conservative state legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation. 
Institutional concerns are expected to influence legislative decision-making as 
well.  Legislative professionalism is expected to influence a legislature’s desire and 
ability to act. Legislative professionalism is conceptualized in terms of institutional 
resources including pay session length, and staff.  A more professional legislature is 
expected to be more likely to wage a “turf war” against the court because it is more 
confident in its own abilities to make law, and because the cost of legislating is 
decreased. 
H7:  Professional state legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation. 
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 Gubernatorial preferences are also expected to influence the enactment of 
legislation.    When enacting a statute, the legislature must take into account the threat of 
executive veto.  If a state legislature suspects that a bill is likely to be vetoed by the 
governor, it might behave strategically by declining to pursue the bill in the first place.  
Also, a governor might assert pressure on the legislature to pursue certain policies.  For 
instance, in 2005 Governor Jeb Bush issued a press release urging the Florida Legislature 
to take action regarding tort reform.  Republican governors have tended to be more 
supportive of tort reform due to the conservative nature of the issue.  Hence, I 
hypothesize, 
H8:  State legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation when the governor 
is Republican.   
  Additionally, unified versus divided party control of the government is expected 
to influence a legislature’s ability to enact legislation.   Research on policy enactment has 
suggested that state governments under unified party control are more productive in 
enacting polices than those under divided control (Berry and Berry 1990, 1992; Alt and 
Lowry 1994; Langer and Brace 2005). Thus, 
H9:  State legislatures are less likely to enact tort reform legislation under divided party 
control.    
 
 
 
 Control Variables 
 Research has demonstrated a positive regional affect on policy diffusion across 
the states, meaning that states are more likely to enact certain policies if neighboring 
states have enacted similar policies (Hays and Glick 1997; Minstrom 1997; Mooney 
2001).  Thus, I expect, 
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H10:  State legislatures are more likely to enact tort reform legislation when neighboring 
states have enacted tort reform legislation.  
 I’ve discussed how the mass media and interest groups have worked together to 
influence the mass public’s perception about the need for tort reform.   However, beyond 
this effect, there is the possibility that an actual need for tort reform might affect 
legislative decision-making.  The necessity of tort reform is often justified by a 
discussion of both the frequency and severity of civil litigation (Danzon 1984; Lee, 
Brown, and Schmit 1994).  The tort reform movement has been attributed to a perceived 
“litigation explosion” engendering popular perception that increases in civil litigation are 
increasingly burdensome to society (Johnston 2007).   Additionally, three different 
“medical malpractice crises” have been identified in the last four decades defined by 
escalating insurance premiums (Viscusi et al. 1993; Thorpe 2004).   Rather than simply 
the perception of a “litigation crisis” or “medical malpractice crisis”, the actual reality of 
the situation might be influencing legislative decision-making.  Or in contrast, if the mere 
perception of the need for tort reform is driving legislative decision-making than these 
hypothesized relationships should be insignificant.  
H10:  As the amount of civil filings increase, state legislatures are more likely to enact 
tort reform legislation.  
 
H11: As insurance premiums increase, state legislatures are more likely to enact tort 
reform legislation.   
 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
The Dependent Variable 
 The hypotheses articulated in the previous section are examined by considering 
the legislative enactment of tort reform statutes across all fifty states between 1975 and 
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2004.   I include four types of tort reform statutes in my analysis: 1) caps on punitive 
damages; 2) caps on non-economic damages; 3) statutes abolishing joint and several 
liability; 4) statutes abolishing the collateral source rule.   
Punitive damages are the damages awarded in order to deter the behavior of the 
defendant rather than award the plaintiff.  Proponents of tort reform often cite excessive 
punitive damage awards as evidence of the need to reign in jury verdicts through 
legislative caps.  For instance, media coverage of the “McDonald’s hot coffee case” 
Liebeck v.  McDonald’s Corp. (1994) frequently called attention to the 2.7 million dollar 
punitive damage award as evidence that jury verdicts have become excessive 
(Robbennolt and Studebaker 1999; Haltom and McCann 2001).   Despite empirical 
evidence showing that punitive damages are awarded infrequently and are rarely large, 
caps on punitive damages have become a critical component of the tort reform movement 
(Robbenalt and Studebaker 1991; Haltom and McCann 2001).  The American Tort 
Reform Association, for instance, favors punitive damage caps, arguing that punitive 
damage jury awards are unpredictable and lead to inconsistent outcomes.  The ATRA 
makes a similar argument regarding non-economic damages. 
Non-economic damages are the damages awarded to a plaintiff for intangible 
injuries such as pain and suffering.  Non-economic damages are also referred to as 
“quality-of-life” damages.   In the case of Judd v. Drezga (2007) discussed in Chapter I, 
the justices discussed how the 1.25 million dollars awarded to baby Athan was meant to 
compensate for “the difference between a life as a normal, healthy boy, and a life as he 
must now live it: severely brain damaged, with drastically reduced life experiences and 
expectations”.   Proponents of tort reform argue that legislative caps on non-economic 
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damages are needed to combat a “medical malpractice crisis” in which doctors are forced 
to close their practices due to rising insurance costs.   
Joint and several liability is a system of recovery in which plaintiffs may recover 
all damages from any one of the defendants regardless of their percentage of the fault.  
Many state legislatures have enacted statutes abolishing the rule of joint and several 
liability, replacing it with a rule of proportionate liability in which defendants can only be 
responsible for their percentage of the fault.  Statutes abolishing joint and several liability 
became a central focus of tort reform advocates in the early stages of the movement (Lee, 
Brown, and Schmit 1995).  Abrogation of the collateral source rule has also been a 
principle objective of tort reform proponents.  The collateral source rule prohibits the 
defense from providing evidence at trial demonstrating that a plaintiff has already been 
compensated from other sources such as insurance or worker’s compensation.  
Proponents of tort reform argue that the collateral source rule allows plaintiffs to collect 
twofold for their injuries, while opponents argue that the rule keeps plaintiffs from being 
penalized for carrying insurance.   
  Damage caps statutes and statutes abolishing joint and several liability and the 
collateral source rule are all considered tort reform statutes because they limit a plaintiff’s 
ability to collect damages.   I have chosen to focus my attention on these four specific 
types of tort reform statutes because they have been the most popular and pervasive.  The 
years in which each of these statute types became law was available through “The 
Database of State Tort Law Reforms” constructed by Ronen Avraham (2006).  The 
database is the most “detailed, complete, and comprehensive” dataset of tort reforms in 
the United States (Avraham 2006).  Funded by NSF grant #045221, Avraham organized a 
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comprehensive dataset of tort reform statutes by integrating a number of online datasets 
and sorting through state codes’ and case law.  Among a number of other variables, the 
database includes the statute type and effective date of tort reform statutes enacted in all 
fifty states, which forms the basis of the dependent variable in my model.  The dependent 
variable in my model is a dichotomous realization of whether or not each of these statute 
types became law in a given year.  Due to the nature of this dependent variable, I have 
chosen to use Stratified Cox Methodology.     
 
The Stratified Cox Model 
 I have chosen to use an event history model because I am interested in both the 
likelihood that an event will occur and how my independent variables influence the 
timing of the event’s occurrence.  More specifically, I have chosen to use Stratified Cox 
methodology to estimate my model for the reasons outlined by Langer and Brace (2005) 
in their study on the enactment of abortion statutes:  first, the different tort reform statutes 
are assumed to be independent and unordered; second, the likelihood and rate of 
enactment varies across the four different tort reforms, as presumably some tort reform 
statutes are more controversial than others.  For example, legislatively capping damages 
has been more controversial than statutes abolishing joint liability (Kelly and Mello 2005, 
Conroy 2006).  The Stratified Cox Model estimates the likelihood of a statute being 
enacted in a particular year given that it was not enacted in a previous year.  The 
Stratified Cox model estimates the likelihood of a state enacting any one of the four 
statutes types within a given year.  The Stratified Cox model accounts for the fact that the 
different statute types are not expected to be enacted at the same rate.   By allowing the 
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different policies to have different hazard rates, the Stratified Cox methodology produces 
the most accurate estimates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).   
 The model considers the legislative enactment of tort reform over a twenty-four 
year period 1975-2004.  The states that do not enact a given tort reform statute during the 
period are right-censored (see Langer and Brace 2005, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
1997).  Additionally, a couple of states that already had a given policy in place prior to 
1975 have necessarily been excluded from the analysis.  Hence, at this point, it is 
important to discuss the decision and consequences of beginning the analysis in 1975. 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) acknowledge that one of the most salient concerns 
when using an event history model is determining “when the clock starts ticking.”   While 
sometimes the answer is obvious, other times it is not so clear.  When the answer is less 
than obvious, such as the start of the tort reform movement, the authors recommend 
looking for a “sensible and defensible definition”, while simultaneously acknowledging 
that the researcher must often be guided by data availability.    I begin my analysis with 
1975 for both of the reasons outlined by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004).  First, by 
almost all accounts, the modern conversation on “tort reform” was first introduced in the 
mid 1970’s (Danzon 1984, Viscusi et al. 1993, Thorpe 2004).  Second beginning with 
1975 allows me to include a wide array of important independent variables.  Fortunately, 
this decision has led to very little loss of information; there are only four cases that have 
been excluded from the analysis because the state all ready had a statute in place before 
1975.   
Additionally, the model accounts for the fact that legislatures can reenact tort 
reform statutes if the state supreme court strikes a statute down.   If a court strikes down a 
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tort reform statute, the state reenters the model at that point in time because the event 
might then reoccur.  For instance, if a punitive damage cap is enacted by the Alabama 
legislature in 1990 and struck down by the supreme court in 1993, the state reenters the 
model in 1993 because another punitive damage cap could be enacted.   This follows 
from the SSOP game’s assumption that the court does not always have the last move; the 
legislature can retaliate by choosing to enact new legislation.   
 
The Independent Variables 
The conditional relationship expected between the political environment and court 
preferences is operationalized as an interactive variable capturing the effect of court 
hostility within an environment in which retaliation would be costly.  Following from my 
discussion of the political environment in the context of tort reform, a very supportive 
environment is one in which the state’s citizens are conservative, there is pro-reform 
news coverage, and the ATRA is present.  If one of these conditions does not hold, a state 
legislature is not expected to have the sufficient public support necessary to retaliate and 
is expected to be constrained by court preferences. 
  Citizen ideology is measured using the Berry et al. (1998) measure of citizen 
ideology.  The Berry et al. measure is based on interest group ratings of members of 
Congress as well as election results.  The Berry et al. measure is attractive because it 
accounts for changes in citizen ideology across time, and it is more precise than previous 
measures of citizen ideology because it considers the share of the electorate supporting 
certain candidates rather than simply the electoral outcome. The measure is on a 0-100 
scale with higher numbers representing increased liberalism. For the purposes of my 
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analysis, conservative citizen ideology is conceptualized as one standard deviation below 
the mean ideology.   
Pro-reform news coverage is measured as the number of news stories in each 
state/year which contain the phrase “frivolous lawsuits”.  This data was collected by the 
author using Lexis/Nexus.  As I mentioned in Chapter I, pro-reform news coverage has 
varied across both time and space.   Figure 3.1 shows the number of stories containing the 
phrase “frivolous lawsuits” across the states in 2000.   
 
Figure 3.1 Pro-Reform News Coverage across the States in 2000 
 
Red= 51-100 stories 
Orange= 21-50 stories 
Yellow=10-20 stories 
Green=1-9 stories 
Blue=0 stories 
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Figure 3.2 demonstrates how the news coverage has changed over time.   While in the 
initial years of the movement pro-reform news coverage was scarce, there was a country-
wide increase in coverage 1990 -1995 and 2000-2005.   
 
Figure 3.2 Pro-Reform News Coverage across Time 
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In summary, constrained environment is a dichotomous variable equal to one 
when one of these conditions does not hold:  pro-reform news coverage, ATRA 
influence, and conservative citizens.  In order to test the conditional relationship between 
the political environment and court preferences, this dichotomous variable is interacted 
with a measure of court hostility.  As discussed previously, court hostility is expressed in 
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terms of both court ideology and court professionalism.  Court ideology is captured using 
the Brace et al. (2001) PAJID measure of judicial ideology in which higher scores 
indicate increased liberalism.  The PAJID measure of judicial ideology uses the Berry et 
al. measure of either elite or citizen ideology at the time of the justices initial selection to 
the bench (using the elite measure for appointed justices and the citizen measure of 
elected justices) and weighs these scores by the justice’s political party (Brace Langer, 
Hall 2001).  Court professionalism is operationalized through the Squire (2007) measure 
of court professionalism which includes indicators of pay, staff resources, and docket 
control.  Higher numbers indicate increased professionalism. Courts that are well funded, 
staffed, and have more discretion over their dockets are considered more professional. 
Court hostility is an interaction between court professional and court ideology.  Hence, 
the most hostile state supreme court is one in which justices are both liberal and 
professional.   
The Berry et al. (1998) measure of state elite ideology is used as a surrogate 
measure of legislative ideology. The Berry et al. measure is an annual measure of state 
elite ideology based on interest group rating of members of Congress and takes into 
account the relative strength of the political parties in both chambers of the legislative 
branch and the governorship. The Berry et al. measure is one a 0-100 scale with higher 
numbers representing increased liberalism.  While, the Berry et al. measure is the best 
surrogate measure of legislative ideology available for the time period studied, I must 
note that the measure is only a surrogate for legislative ideology and cannot be used to 
distinguish between legislative and gubernatorial preferences.   Thus, I include a measure 
of gubernatorial support to try to isolate the effect of gubernatorial preferences. 
 
 
78 
 
Gubernatorial support is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the governor is 
Republican and zero otherwise.   
Legislative professionalism is captured through the Squire (2007) measure which 
includes indicators of pay, session length, and staff resources.  These indicators are 
expected to reflect a legislature’s ability to act.  Legislatures that have better paid 
members, longer session lengths, and more staff resources are considered more 
professional.  The measure is available for 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003 and the data is 
extrapolated for additional years.  Higher values represent more professional legislatures. 
Divided party control is also a dichotomous variable, equal to one when different parties 
control the two houses of the legislature or different parties control the legislature and the 
governorship.  These data were collected from Carl Klarner’s Partisan Balance Dataset, 
available through The State Politics and Policy Quarterly Data Resource.   
Neighboring state enactments is the percentage of states in the preceding year that 
enacted tort reform legislation.  This variable was computed by the author using the 
Avraham (2006) “Database of State Tort Reforms”. Insurance premiums is an interval 
level variable indicating the insurance premiums for each year divided by the consumer 
price index.  This variable was collected from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 
available through the U.S. Census Bureau, and does not vary across states.  Civil filings 
is an interval level variable of the number of civil filings in the state trial courts of 
general jurisdiction divided by the population in each state/year.  This data was available 
through the Bureau of Justice Statistics and National Center for State Courts’ Statistics 
Project State Court Caseload Summary Statistics.   
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Table 3.1 summarizes the relationships I expect between the independent 
variables and the likelihood of state legislature enacting a tort reform statute. When the 
political environment is not supportive, court hostility is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of enactment.  Legislative liberalism and divided party control are also 
expected to decrease the likelihood of enactment.  Increased legislative professionalism, 
gubernatorial support, and neighboring state enactments are expected to increase the 
likelihood of enactment.  Additionally, an increase in insurance premiums and civil 
filings is expected to increase the likelihood of enactment.   
 
Table 3.1 Expected Relationships between the Independent Variables and the Likelihood 
of Enactment 
 
Independent Variables Likelihood of Enactment 
Environment Type x Court Hostility -- 
Legislative Liberalism -- 
Legislative Professionalism + 
Divided Party Control -- 
Gubernatorial Support + 
Neighboring State Enactments + 
Insurance Premiums + 
Civil Filings + 
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Results 
 
Table 3.2 Stratified Cox Model of Legislative Tort Reform Enactments 1975-2004 
Observations 3,493 
 LR2  22.76 
 Log Likelihood -472.826 
 *Significant at the .1 level or better; **  Significant the .05 level or better 
 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the Stratified Cox regression analysis of the 
timing of tort reform statutes.  The signs on the coefficients indicate whether the 
covariates are associated with an increase or decrease in the likelihood of enactment.  
Positive coefficients mean that the variable decreases the time until enactment, while 
negative coefficients mean that the variable increases the time until enactment. A number 
of variables achieve statistical significance in the expected direction.   The interaction 
between the political environment and court preferences, legislative liberalism, legislative 
professionalism, divided party control, news coverage, and civil filings, are all 
statistically significant in the expected direction at the .10 level or better. Court 
professionalism (taken alone), ATRA presence (taken alone), insurance premiums, 
Covariate Coefficient Standard Error Z-Zone 
Environment x Court -.020 .013 -1.56* 
Court Liberalism .014 .009 1.68** 
Court Professionalism -.230 .774 -.290 
Positive News Coverage .822 .191 4.29** 
ATRA Presence -29.499 374 .000 
Citizen Ideology .013 .010 1.34* 
Legislative Liberalism -.020 .008 -2.34** 
Legislative Professionalism 2.030 .899 2.25** 
Divided Party Control -.361 .184 1.96** 
Gubernatorial Support .057 .293 .190 
Neighboring State 
Enactments 
.750 1.151 .650 
Insurance Premiums .003 .003 1.20 
Civil Filings .005 .003 1.66** 
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gubernatorial support, and neighboring state enactment fail to achieve significance at any 
respectable level. 
The results support the conclusion that a conditional relationship exists between 
the political environment and the preferences of the court in influencing a legislature’s 
decision to enact.  When the political environment is not supportive, the preferences of 
the court have a very salient effect on legislative decision-making.   The likelihood of 
enactment decreases as court hostility increases.  In other words, as a court becomes 
increasingly liberal and professional, the legislature is less likely to enact. Figure 3.3 
shows the difference in enactment rates when a legislature is unconstrained, meaning that 
the political environment is supportive, versus when the legislature is most constrained, 
meaning that the political environment is not supportive and the court is both liberal and 
professional.  We can see graphically that when the political environment is hostile, court 
preferences have a significant effect on both the rate and likelihood of enactment.  
When the legislature is in a supportive political environment, in 2005 the 
likelihood of a state not having a enacted a tort reform statute is at nearly zero, meaning 
that state legislature operating within a supportive environment is almost one hundred 
percent likely to have enacted a tort reform statute by 2005.  However, when the political 
environment is not supportive, court hostility significantly reduces the likelihood of 
enactment.   The likelihood of non-enactment in 2005 is over seventy percent, meaning 
that when the environment and court are both hostile, the likelihood of enactment is less 
than thirty percent.  An unconstrained legislature is over seventy percent more likely to 
enact a tort reform statute than a legislature that must face a hostile court in a less than 
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supportive environment.  When a legislature cannot retaliate, court hostility dramatically 
decreases the likelihood of enactment. 
 
Figure 3.3 Interaction Effect: Court Hostility x Political Environment on Decision to 
Enact Tort Reform Legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to hypothesis, court liberalism alone increases rather than decreases the 
likelihood of enactment – and its effect would have been statistically significant (at .05) 
had I hypothesized its positive effect in advance.   This finding also supports the 
conclusion that the relationship between court preferences and legislative decision-
making is conditioned by the political environment.   In general, a legislature may be 
more likely to enact tort reform statutes in states with liberal courts because the tort 
reforms are meant to curb liberal court decisions.   However, when the political 
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environment is hostile, court liberalism decreases the likelihood of enactment because the 
legislature does not have the political capital necessary to retaliate against the court.   
Court preferences only encourage strategic behavior by state legislators when the 
political environment is not supportive.   As long as the state legislators can mobilize 
public support for tort reforms, they behave sincerely by enacting reforms to counter 
liberal court doctrines.   
In addition to the interactive effect, a number of other independent variables have 
a salient effect on legislative decision-making.  As expected, legislative liberalism 
decreases the likelihood of enactment.  Figure 3.4 shows the differences in enactment 
rates between the most liberal state legislature and the most conservative state legislature.  
Legislative liberalism decreases both the rate and likelihood of enactment.  The 
likelihood of the most conservative state legislature having a tort reform statute enacted 
by 2005 is almost one hundred percent compared to only forty percent for the most 
liberal state legislature.   However, while the effect of legislative ideology is quite 
substantial, the change in rates is slightly less than the change between an unconstrained 
and constrained legislature, as explained above.   While state legislators are influenced by 
their own policy preferences, they must often act strategically in light of the policy 
preferences of the broader political environment including the judicial branch.  
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Figure 3.4 Effect of Legislative Ideology on the Decision to Enact Tort Reform 
Legislation 
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While state legislators are influenced by their policy preferences, they are also 
affected by institutional concerns.  Figure 3.5 shows the difference in rate of enactment 
between the most professional and least professional state legislature. The more 
professional state legislature is 35 percent more likely to have enacted a tort reform 
statute by 2005 than the least professional legislature. Institutional resources influence a 
legislature’s ability to successfully enact legislation. The relative cost of enacting 
legislation is less for a more professional state legislature.   
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Figure 3.5 Effect of Legislative Professionalism on the Decision to Enact Tort Reform 
Legislation 
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  Three additional inter-institutional factors also have a significant effect on the 
legislative enactment of tort reform statutes.  Divided control of government leads to an 
increase in the time until enactment.  This result is in line with previous studies that 
demonstrated that legislatures are more productive under unified control.   There is also 
some evidence that an actual need for tort reform rather than simply a perceived need has 
influenced the decision of state legislators to enact tort reform statutes.  As the rate of 
civil filings increase, the rate and likelihood of enactment increases as well.  A rise in the 
amount of civil filings has a salient effect on the enactment of tort reform legislation.  
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Figure 3.6 displays the difference in enactment when the number of civil filings is held at 
its minimum and maximum values.  When the number of civil filings peak, the likelihood 
of enactment is near one hundred percent in 2005 compared to less than seventy percent 
when the number of civil filings is held at its minimum.   An increase in the number of 
civil filings seems to be an appropriate indicator of the necessity of tort reform.  When 
legislators witness an increase in the number of civil cases filed they are more likely to 
enact tort reform legislation. 
 
Figure 3.6 Effect of Increase in Civil Filings on the Decision to Enact Tort Reform 
Legislation 
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In addition, the model demonstrates that the rate and likelihood of enactment 
differs according to statute type.  Note the difference in enactment rates across the four 
different types of tort reform statutes. The graphical representation of the rates, as seen in 
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Figure 3.7, supports my decision to use a Stratified Cox model.   Forcing the statute types 
to assume the same baseline hazard rate of enactment would have distorted my 
conclusions.   The differences seen between the statute types support my contention that 
some tort reform statutes are viewed as more controversial than others and this affects the 
rate of enactment.   Statutes abolishing joint and several liability and collateral source 
benefits were enacted at a faster rate than legislative damage caps.  
 
Figure 3.7 Enactment Rates by Tort Reform Statute Type 
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Only five of the independent variables, court professionalism (taken alone), 
ATRA presence (taken alone), gubernatorial support, insurance premiums, and 
neighboring state enactments failed to achieve statistical significance.  The failure of 
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court professionalism to achieve statistical significance is not a surprise.  I hypothesized 
that a state legislature only has to consider the preferences of the state supreme courts 
when it cannot retaliate.   Thus, while court professionalism plays a salient role in 
influencing legislative decision-making through the conditional relationship, court 
professionalism alone does not have an effect on a legislature’s decision to enact.   The 
failure of gubernatorial support to achieve statistical significance is not particularly 
surprising either.  As I mentioned earlier, the surrogate measure of legislative ideology in 
the model also takes into account the preferences of the executive branch.  While I 
included the party of the governor to try to isolate the effect of gubernatorial preferences, 
it is possible that the Berry et al. measure of elite ideology actually captures the 
preferences of the executive branch more accurately than mere party identification. Or 
perhaps, because the analysis spans such a large time span, republicanism does not 
accurately capture conservatism.      
Instead of a policy diffusion effect, it appears that similar forces have affected the 
likelihood of tort reform statutes being enacted across the states during certain time 
periods.  As can be seen in Figures 3.3 through 3.6, a number of states chose to enact 
statutes in the mid-1980’s during the perceived “medical malpractice crisis”.   Rather 
than a policy diffusion effect in which a state enacts a tort reform statute and neighboring 
states then follow suit, the broader political environment seems to have encouraged 
policy change across states at the same time.  While variations among the states made 
some states more conducive to reform then other states, there were periods of time when 
the overall climate was more favorable to reform.        
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Conclusion 
 The SSOP model, introduced in Chapter II, highlighted the interdependent nature 
of state policy making.   The three different stages of the policy-making process: the 
legislature’s decision to enact, the court’s decision whether to take the case, and the 
decision-on-the-merits stage are all inherently intertwined.  While the exercise of judicial 
review has been studied as an example of courts’ salient role in the state policy-making 
process, the preemptive power of a court to influence policy-making at the enactment 
stage has not been given adequate attention (for notably exceptions see Langer and Brace 
2005, Wilhelm 2005).   
 In this chapter, I explored how the interdependent relationship between the state 
legislatures and state courts might promote strategic behavior at the legislative enactment 
stage.   My empirical results support the predictions derived from the SSOP model, and 
suggest that the role of the court in the policy-making process may be more complicated 
than previously thought. The strategic relationship between a state legislature and 
supreme court is defined by the nature of a state’s political environment.  While state 
supreme courts may have preemptive power over the enactment of legislation, the power 
is not absolute.  As my equilibria predictions and Stratified Cox results demonstrate, the 
relationship between the coordinate branches is dependent upon the decision-making 
environment.   
When the political environment is supportive, a state legislature can enact tort 
reform legislation regardless of the preferences of the judicial branch.  However, when a 
state legislature cannot rely on sufficient mobilization of public support, retaliation 
against the court can be very costly.   When the legislature cannot retaliate, court 
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preferences significantly influence legislative decision-making.  When the political 
environment is not sufficiently supportive, court hostility encourages strategic behavior 
by state legislatures.  A legislature that does not fear retaliation is seventy percent more 
likely to enact tort reform legislation than a constrained legislature facing a hostile court.    
Moreover, the model demonstrates that ideology is not the only salient predictor 
of legislative behavior. Institutional features also affect the strategic interaction between 
state elite actors.  In the battle to define tort law, state legislatures and courts must rely on 
institutional resources in order to translate their preferences into policy outcomes.  More 
professional state legislatures have more policy success than less professional state 
legislatures.  Additionally, more professional state supreme courts pose more of a threat 
to state legislatures because they have both the desire and ability to shape public policy.    
The results of this analysis support my argument that public policy is best viewed 
as the end result of the interaction between institutional structure, the political 
environment, and the preferences of elite actors.  Through both the SSOP and Stratified 
Cox statistical models, I was able to further refine the conditions under which state 
legislatures are expected to be constrained in the policy-making process.  In the context 
of state tort reform, state legislators behave strategically by declining to enact legislation 
when facing a hostile court in a non supportive environment.  In the next chapter, I 
explore the conditions under which state supreme court justices are constrained at the 
agenda-setting stage.      
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE AGENDA-SETTING STAGE 
In order to accurately capture the strategic behavior of justices in exercising the 
power of judicial review, the two stages of judicial decision-making must be considered: 
the agenda-setting stage and the decision-on-the-merits stage.  At the state supreme court 
level, justices first decide to hear a case by granting review and then make a decision on 
the outcome by voting on the merits.  When policy-making is viewed as a separation of 
powers game, it becomes clear that the two stages of decision-making are interdependent 
and that strategic behavior is not limited to the decision-on-the merits stage.  If justices 
fear public backlash or retaliation by the legislative branch, they might behave 
strategically at the agenda-setting stage by refusing to grant review.  Hence, in order to 
fully understand the strategic relationship between the coordinate branches, we must 
consider judicial behavior at each stage of the decision-making process, beginning with 
the decision to accept, rather than avoid, a judicial review challenge.   
 The agenda-setting is in itself comprised of two different stages (Langer 2002).  
First, a litigant must appeal a lower court decision to the state supreme court.  Second, the 
court must decide to resolve the constitutional challenge raised by the litigants.  Hence, 
even a state supreme court with a mandatory docket can behave strategically at the 
agenda-setting stage.  A court may have to put a case on its docket, but it can still decide 
whether or not to rule on the substantive merits of the case.  Langer (2002) discusses how 
certain legal thresholds - standing, mootness, jurisdiction and others - might serve as 
gatekeeping mechanisms that allow courts to avoid ruling on a constitutional challenge.  
State supreme courts can also choose to simply dismiss the judicial review challenge and 
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resolve other issues raised by the litigants. Choice exists in whether or not to resolve a 
judicial review challenge, and therefore so does the potential for strategic behavior.    I 
expect that institutional features and the broader political environment will define the 
strategic relationship between the court and the legislature at the agenda-setting stage, 
just as they define a legislature’s decision to enact.   The SSOP model developed in 
Chapter II makes predictions about the conditions under which justices are constrained 
when deciding whether to resolve a constitutional challenge.  Before discussing the 
implications of the SSOP model, I will briefly highlight research supporting a strategic 
approach to understanding judicial decision making at the agenda-setting stage. 
 
Strategic Behavior at the Agenda-Setting Stage 
Scholars have long acknowledged the relationship between the two stages of 
judicial decision-making and potential for strategic behavior; however, much of this 
research has been focused on the US Supreme Court.  Much evidence suggests that 
justices make strategic decisions at the agenda-setting stage by looking ahead to the 
expected outcome on the merits.  Schubert (1959) first considered whether justices 
behave strategically when voting to grant writs of certiorari, and found evidence that 
justices’ votes were related to their preferred outcome on the merits.  Sidney Ulmer 
(1972) was the first to theorize that justices pursue an “error correction” strategy, 
deriving more of a benefit from reversing rather than upholding lower court decisions. He 
hypothesized that justices would behave strategically at the agenda-setting stage by 
voting against granting cert when they supported the lower court decision.  Ulmer (1972) 
found evidence of this type of strategic behavior on the US Supreme Court, a finding 
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later substantiated by the work of Brenner (1979), Palmer (1982) and Brenner and Krol 
(1989).  
 Palmer (1982) found a positive relationship between a vote to grant cert and the 
decision on the merits to reverse the lower court; he also found a positive relationship 
between a vote to grant cert and a vote with the majority at the merit stage.  Perry (1991) 
found that justices engage in what he labeled as “defensive denials” and “aggressive 
grants” when voting on cert petitions.  A justice votes a “defensive denial” when his or 
her preferred outcome appears unlikely to prevail at the merits stage; an aggressive grant 
vote conversely occurs when a justice is confident that his or her preferred outcome will 
be decided.    Boucher and Segal (1995) examined the extent to which Supreme Court 
justices engage in aggressive grants and defensive denials and found that justices engage 
in aggressive grants but not defensive denials.  Justices who support affirming the lower 
court decision consider the likely outcome at the merits stage when voting whether to 
grant cert.  Additionally, Epstein and Knight (1998) demonstrated that justices engage in 
both forward thinking and bargaining during the cert process.  This research provides 
compelling evidence that justices behave strategically at the cert stage with a mind to the 
merits stage.  Justices attempt to protect preferred policy from lower courts from reversal 
in an unfavorable court environment as well as expand the scope of the preferred policy 
when in a favorable court environment.   
 Many scholars have noted the interdependence of the two stages of judicial 
decision making and have found ample evidence that justices behave strategically at the 
agenda-setting stage in anticipation of the future actions of their colleagues.  However, 
strategic behavior in light of other actors in the separation of powers system has been far 
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less studied at the agenda-setting stage, though notable exceptions do exist.  Brace, Hall, 
and Langer (1999) found that inter-institutional features affect state supreme court 
decisions to hear challenges to state abortion statutes.  Justices pay attention to the likely 
reactions of the coordinate branch and certain institutional features encourage strategic 
behavior.  Brace, Hall, and Langer (1999) found that divided government, selection 
method, docket control, and term length all significantly affected the likelihood of a state 
supreme court having a docketed judicial review case.   
Langer (2002) found similar results in her study of the judicial review of 
campaign and election law, worker’s and unemployment compensation law, and welfare 
benefit law.  Langer found that state supreme court justices behave as if they are 
constrained by the preferences of the legislative branch in cases of election and campaign 
law. The presence of divergent supreme court and legislature preferences decrease the 
likelihood of a state supreme court having a docketed judicial review case.  However, 
justices appear to behave sincerely regarding cases of worker and unemployment 
compensation and welfare benefits.  Langer (2002) argued that state supreme court 
justices are constrained by the preferences of the legislative branch in campaign and 
election law cases because it is an issue area particularly salient to elite actors.   The 
court’s exercise of judicial review directly affects the reelection chances of other elite 
actors.   
Sticko-Neubauer (2006) further considered how either elite or mass preferences 
might affect a court’s propensity to hear a judicial review challenge, dependent upon the 
type of case and different institutional features.  Contrary to Langer, Stricko-Neubauer 
(2006) found no evidence that justices are constrained by elite preferences regarding 
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campaign and election law.  However, Stricko-Neubauer (2006) did find evidence of 
strategic behavior at the agenda-setting stage regarding social issue cases.   Stricko-
Neubauer (2006) found that preference divergence decreased the likelihood of a court 
hearing a judicial review challenge when justices are retained by state elites.   
While some evidence exists that state supreme court justices take into account 
elite preferences when choosing whether to engage in judicial review, the evidence is 
scant and sometimes even contradictory.  And, though scholars have sought to identify 
the conditions under which strategic rather than sincere behavior is most likely, the 
relationship between the broader political environment and elite behavior has been under 
emphasized.  The SSOP model I developed in Chapter II formalizes the relationship 
between elite preferences, institutional structure, and the political environment, and 
allows for predictions regarding when justices are expected to be constrained at the 
agenda-setting stage of judicial review. 
 
The SSOP Model at the Agenda-Setting Stage 
 The SSOP model’s thresholds define a supportive court’s decision between 
avoiding a statutory challenge and upholding a statute, and a hostile court’s decision 
between avoiding and striking down a statutory challenge.  The decision to avoid weakly 
dominates a supportive court’s decision to uphold.  The logic behind this outcome is 
similar to the logic behind the “error correcting” strategy.  Justices derive more utility 
from striking down statutes that are contrary to their policy preferences than they do from 
upholding statutes which support their policy preferences.  If justices agree with the 
status quo, they have less incentive to review a case.  Additionally, the SSOP model 
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suggests that the political environment plays a salient role in a court’s decision whether to 
decide a judicial review challenge.  If the court suspects the political environment does 
not support the preferences of the judicial branch, it has even less of an incentive to assert 
its own position when it supports the status quo.   
 The SSOP model suggests that court hostility should increase the likelihood of a 
court having a docketed judicial review when the legislature cannot retaliate.  A 
supportive court does not have an incentive to change the status quo, whereas a hostile 
one receives a policy payoff when choosing to rule on the merits.  However, this effect is 
only expected when the court is unconstrained by the state legislature.  When the 
legislature can retaliate against a hostile court, the court will always choose to avoid, 
rather than strike down, a statutory challenge.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
legislature has the political capital to retaliate against a hostile court when the political 
environment reaches a certain threshold of support.  Once again, the SSOP model 
suggests that a conditional relationship exists between the political environment and elite 
preferences.  When the political environment is supportive (i.e. the legislature can 
retaliate), preference divergence between the legislature and the court should decrease the 
likelihood of a docketed judicial review challenge.    
The SSOP model demonstrates that the political environment and public opinion 
have both a direct and also indirect effect on the behavior of justices at the agenda-setting 
stage.  All justices must consider the political environment because it provides cues about 
when legislative retaliation is likely to occur.  Hence, the political environment is 
expected to have an indirect effect on the decision-making of state supreme court justices.  
Additionally, mass public opinion is expected to exert a direct effect on the behavior of 
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some justices. Different selection and retention methods link the justices’ futures to both 
the mass public and also to other elite actors by varying degrees. 
 The SSOP model shows that the probability of a court hearing a judicial review 
challenge changes when the justices are beholden to public opinion.  When justices face 
competitive reelections, the cost of opposing public opinion can be particularly high.  
Therefore, the SSOP model predicts that when justices face competitive retention 
elections, public opinion will act as a direct constraint on their behavior when their policy 
preferences diverge from the preferences of the mass public.  Under this scenario, a court 
will be more likely to avoid ruling on a judicial review challenge.  The option of avoiding 
the controversy allows the court to avoid paying a public opinion cost.       
However, as discussed in Chapter II, the option of avoiding a judicial review 
challenge is not equally accessible across the fifty state supreme courts.  For instance, 
nineteen state supreme courts have mandatory dockets for civil appeals.  Though these 
state supreme courts can still rely on gatekeeping mechanisms to avoid ruling on the 
constitutional challenge, strategic avoidance is not as effortless for these courts as for 
courts that can simply deny review.  Additionally, gatekeeping mechanisms or the refusal 
to resolve the constitutional challenge within a docketed case might actually draw more 
attention to the behavior of the court, denying the court the benefits of avoidance.   
Hence, the SSOP model suggests that when the court has a mandatory docket, it will be 
more likely to engage in judicial review.   
The SSOP model sheds light on the conditions under which courts are expected to 
review challenges to tort reform statutes.  Specific hypotheses derived from the SSOP 
model are discussed in the next section.  However, the SSOP model only focuses on how 
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a few key independent variables affect a court’s decision-making calculus.  Additional 
variables which might affect the likelihood of a court hearing a docketed judicial review 
case are also considered in the proceeding section.   
 
Hypotheses 
 When a court is unconstrained, meaning that is does not fear retaliation, 
preference divergence between the court and legislature is expected to increase the 
likelihood of a court having a docketed judicial review challenge.  A state supreme court 
is expected to be unconstrained when the political environment is less supportive of tort 
reform.  As in Chapter II, a supportive political environment is defined as one in which 
the American Tort Reform Association is active, there is pro-reform news coverage, and 
citizens are conservative.  When one or more of these conditions does not hold, the state 
legislature does not have the political capital to retaliate against the court. When the court 
does not expect retaliation, it can behave sincerely.  As the court is  increasingly more 
liberal than the state legislature, the likelihood of the court hearing a judicial review 
challenge should increase because a court receives more of a payoff for challenging 
rather than accepting the status quo. 2   
However, when the political environment is supportive of tort reform, divergent 
preferences should decrease the likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.   When a 
hostile court fears retaliation, it will avoid ruling on a judicial review challenge because it 
                                                           
2  One potential problem is deciding where the status quo stands if a lower court has invalidated a tort 
reform statute.  I argue that the state supreme courts do not consider the status quo changed until it has 
ruled on the merits.  Conflicting lower court decisions preserve the status quo because citizens cannot rely 
on a definitive definition of the law.  This type of reasoning by state supreme court justices is supported by 
research that demonstrates that state supreme court justices are more likely to invalidate state laws if lower 
courts have found the law unconstitutional (Emmert 1992, Langer 2002).     
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cannot decide according to its sincere preferences.  Hence, when the political 
environment is supportive, more liberal state supreme courts should be less likely to have 
a docketed tort reform challenge when they face conservative state legislatures.   Thus, I 
hypothesize, 
H1:  When the political environment is supportive, the likelihood of a docketed tort 
reform challenge decreases as the ideological distance between the court and legislature 
increases. 
 
 State supreme courts as a whole look to the political environment to assess the 
retaliatory strength of the legislative branch, but justices retained through competitive 
elections must also be concerned with electoral retaliation.  When justices face 
competitive retention elections their fate is ultimately tied to the preferences of the mass 
public.  Thus, when justices are more liberal than their constituents they risk retaliation 
when asserting their sincere preferences regarding tort reform.  Liberal justices are 
expected to behave strategically in light of this threat by avoiding a tort reform challenge.  
Hence, 
H2:  When justices are retained by competitive retention elections, the likelihood of a 
docketed tort reform challenge decreases as the ideological distance between the court 
and the mass public increases.    
 
 By avoiding ruling on a tort reform challenge, justices opposed to tort reform can 
shirk retaliation without having to rule against their sincere preferences at the decision on 
the merits stage.  In the previous section, I argued that some courts have more of an 
opportunity to engage in this type of strategic behavior.  The presence of an intermediate 
appellate court is identified as institutional feature that provides state supreme courts with 
more discretion over their dockets (Glick 1991; Brace, Hall, Langer 1999; Langer 2002).  
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Thus, the presence of an intermediate appellate court might facilitate the strategic 
deflection of controversial cases.    
However, while this effect seems entirely plausible, other scholars have found 
that the presence of an intermediate appellate court increases the likelihood of a court 
hearing a judicial review challenge (Langer 2002; Stricko-Neubauer 2006).  Intermediate 
courts might increase the likelihood of judicial review by decreasing the workload of 
state supreme court justices and filtering through more mundane cases so that only the 
most complex and difficult cases are appealed to the state supreme court (Langer 2002; 
Stricko-Neubauer 2006).  Additionally, an intermediate appellate court might lead to 
increased inter-court conflict and thus increased likelihood of judicial review (Langer 
2002).  In this light, the presence of an intermediate appellate court might make strategic 
avoidance easier, but it might also provide justices with an opportunity to choose cases 
which are the best vehicles for advancing their policy preferences.  Considering this, I 
offer a two-tailed hypothesis, 
H3:  The presence of an intermediate appellate court should increase/decrease the 
likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.     
Beyond the relationships highlighted by the SSOP model, a number of other 
factors might influence the strategic relationship between the legislature and the court.  
Different institutional features affect both the court’s ability to act and the legislature’s 
ability to retaliate against a hostile court. As discussed in the previous chapters, court 
professionalism is expected to influence a court’s desire and ability to act.  More 
professional courts are expected to resent legislative invasion into their “turf” and also 
feel more confident about standing up to the legislature.  Also, more professional state 
courts have the resources necessary to challenge the state legislature.  Hence, 
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H4:   The likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge should increase with an increase 
in court professionalism.      
In contrast, increased legislative professionalism should decrease the ability of a 
court to assert its sincere preferences into the policy-making process.   When a state 
legislature is more professional, it is also expected to have the incentive and ability to act, 
meaning that state supreme courts should fear retaliation from more professional state 
legislatures.   Thus, 
H5:  The likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge should decrease with an increase 
in legislative professionalism.    
State supreme courts should be less constrained during periods of divided 
government. The ability of a state legislature to retaliate against a court should decrease 
under periods of divided government because retaliation requires coordination between 
the legislative chambers and among the executive and legislative branch.   A state 
legislature will have a more difficult time enacting a new tort reform statute or engaging 
in a constitutional override when the government is divided (Brace, Hall, Langer 1999; 
Langer 2002; Stricko-Neubauer 2006).   
H6:  The likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge will increase under periods of 
divided government.     
 
 Constitutional override of a judicial decision is an extreme form of retaliation 
against the court.   Constitutional amendment not only reverses the decision of the court 
but also affects the options available to future justices (Langer 2002).  Because state 
constitutions are more easily amended than the United States Constitution, constitutional 
override is a relevant concern for state supreme court justices when deciding whether to 
engage in judicial review (Langer 2002).  Some state supreme courts are expected to fear 
retaliation through constitutional override more acutely than others because the difficulty 
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in amending state constitutions varies across states.  Some state constitutions require a 
two-thirds vote in the legislature and subsequent approval by the electorate in order to 
amend the constitutions.  In these states, the difficult amendment procedure is expected to 
decrease the court’s fear of constitutional override.   
H7:  The likelihood of docketed tort reform challenge will increase in states with a 
difficult amendment procedure.      
 
 Longer term lengths have been shown to increase the likelihood of court hearing a 
judicial review challenge (Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999; Langer 2002).  Longer terms 
lengths increase judicial independence and decrease judicial accountability to the public 
and other elite actors.  Justices with longer term lengths are expected to be able to pursue 
their sincere preferences with less constraint because they are less fearful of a negative 
retention vote (Langer 2002).   When justices have longer term lengths they are less 
likely to be punished by the public or other elite actors for one particular decision 
(Stricko-Neubauer 2006).   Therefore, I expect, 
H8:  The likelihood of docketed tort reform challenge will increase as judicial term length 
increases.  
 In summary, a court’s decision to exercise judicial review is influenced by a 
number of different factors.  When deciding whether to engage in judicial review, a court 
behaves strategically by looking ahead to the expected reaction of both the state 
legislature and mass public.   A court is constrained by the preferences of other actors in 
the system when institutional and environmental factors facilitate legislative or electoral 
retaliation.  Table 4.1 summarizes the relationships I expect between these different 
factors and the likelihood of a court hearing a tort reform challenge. 
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Table 4.1 Expected Relationships between the Independent Variables and the Likelihood 
of a Court Hearing a Tort Reform Challenge 
 
Independent Variables Likelihood of a Docketed Case 
Supportive Environment x (Court 
Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism) 
_ 
Elected Court x (Court Liberalism-Mass 
Public Liberalism) 
_ 
Intermediate Appellate Court -- or + 
Increased Court Professionalism + 
Increased Legislative Professionalism -- 
Divided Government + 
Difficult Amendment Procedure + 
Longer Term Lengths + 
 
 
 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
The Dependent Variable  
The hypotheses articulated in the previous section are examined by considering 
the existence of cases challenging the constitutionality of legislative tort reform statutes 
on state supreme court dockets across all fifty states between 1975 and 2004.    Agenda-
setting is conceptualized here as the existence of a docketed tort reform challenge, rather 
than an actual vote at the agenda-setting stage because state supreme courts do not record 
their decisions to accept or deny hearing a case (Langer 2002).   Therefore, the dependent 
variable is a dichotomous realization of whether a state supreme court has a case 
challenging the constitutionality of a tort reform statute on its docket in a given year.  I 
focus on challenges to the four types of statutes considered in Chapter III: 1) caps on 
punitive damages; 2) caps on noneconomic damages; 3) statutes abolishing joint and 
several liability; 4) statutes abolishing the collateral source rule.   
 
 
104 
 
 I have chosen to employ Stratified Cox methodology for the same reasons 
outlined in Chapter III.    First, I have chosen an event history model because I am 
interested in the overall likelihood of a court hearing a tort reform challenge, as well as 
how my independent variables influence the timing of when it chooses to hear a 
challenge.  Second, I have chosen the Stratified Cox model, in particular, because the 
likelihood and rate of a court docketing a tort reform challenge might vary across the four 
different statute types.  In Chapter III, the rates of enactment differed according to 
statutes type, with state legislatures enacting statutes abolishing joint and several liability 
and the collateral source rule at faster rates than damage caps.  Similarly, I do not expect 
state supreme courts to accept cases challenging the constitutionality of these statute 
types at the same rate.  Courts might be more likely to rule on statutes abolishing joint 
and several liability and the collateral source rule sooner after enactment because these 
statutes are considered less controversial than damage cap statutes. Or instead, courts 
might be more likely to accept cases challenging damage cap statutes at a faster rate 
because of their policy salience.   
The Stratified Cox Model estimates the likelihood of a challenge to each of the 
statute types being heard by a state supreme court in a particular year given that it was 
not heard in the previous year. Logically, a state supreme court only has an opportunity to 
docket a case challenging a tort reform statute after a statute has been enacted.   Thus, 
states enter the analysis at different years depending on when a state legislature enacted a 
particular statute type.   These data, also used in Chapter III, were available from the 
Avraham (2006) “Database of State Tort Reforms”.  Schwartz and Lorber (2001) have 
identified all state court decisions resolving a constitutional challenge to a tort reform 
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statute between 1983 and 2001 and Mark Behrens has identified the cases resolved after 
2001.   I identified the state court decisions prior to 1983 through a West Law search of 
the statute numbers of tort reform laws enacted before 1983.   I have read and coded all 
of the state supreme court cases on a number of independent variables, one being the type 
of statute considered.  This research provided the necessary information to construct the 
dependent variable for this model. 
 
The Independent Variables     
 The conditional relationship expected between the political environment and elite 
preferences is conceptualized as an interactive variable capturing the effect of divergent 
preferences within a political environment in which the legislature is expected to 
retaliate.  As in Chapter III, a supportive environment (in which retaliation is likely) is 
one in which the ATRA is active, there is pro-reform news coverage, and citizens are 
conservative.  Thus, a supportive environment is a dichotomous variable equal to one 
when all of these conditions hold.  The interaction looks at the difference between court 
and legislative ideology in a supportive political environment.  The Brace et al. (2001) 
PAJID measure of judicial ideology and the Berry et al. measure of elite ideology are 
used as surrogates for the preferences of the state supreme courts and legislatures. Recall 
that both measures are on a 0-100 scale with positive numbers indicating greater 
liberalism. In terms of the interaction, positive numbers indicate that the court is more 
liberal than the state legislature. When the court is constrained (i.e. the political 
environment is supportive) increased court liberalism is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of a court having a docketed tort reform challenge.   
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 The conditional relationship hypothesized between selection method and court-
mass public preference divergence is operationalized as an interaction capturing the 
effect of increased court liberalism when justices are retained by competitive retention 
elections.  Competitive elections is a dichotomous variable equal to one when justices are 
retained by voters in an election involving an opponent.  The Berry et al. measure of 
citizen ideology is used as a surrogate for state public opinion and positive numbers 
indicate that the state supreme court is more liberal.  When justices are retained through 
competitive retention elections, increased court liberalism is expected to decrease the 
likelihood of a court having a docketed tort reform challenge.        
 A dichotomous variable captures whether a state has an intermediate appellate 
court.  Divided government is also a dichotomous variable equal to one when different 
parties control the two houses of the legislature or different parties control the legislature 
and the governorship. Court and legislative professionalism are measured using the 
Squire measures of professionalism.  (For additional information on how these variables 
were measured please refer to Chapter III).  
 Amendment difficulty is a dichotomous variable equal to one when a state 
requires that a constitutional amendment be passed by a 2/3 vote in the legislature and 
approved by the electorate.  Thirty states require this difficult amendment procedure 
requiring both a super legislative majority and electoral approval (Langer 2002).  Term 
length is measured by number of years, and ranges from six to a life term. Justices on the 
New Hampshire and Massachusetts supreme courts serve until age seventy; a proxy 
variable of twenty years is used for these two cases.  Rhode Island justices are the only 
ones who serve life terms; a proxy variable of thirty years is used in this instance.   
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Results 
 
Table 4.2 Stratified Cox Model of Docketed Tort Reform Challenges 1975-2004 
Covariate Coefficient Standard Error Z-Zone 
Supportive Environment x (Court 
Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism) 
-.027 .021 -1.27* 
Supportive Environment .597 .434 1.38* 
Court Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism .017 .007 2.51** 
Elected Court x (Court Liberalism-Mass 
Public Liberalism) 
-.024 .014 -1.73** 
Elected Court .077 .273 .28 
Court Liberalism-Mass Public 
Liberalism 
-.009 .010 -.87 
Intermediate Appellate Court .582 .464 1.26 
Court Professionalism 2.175 1.219 1.78** 
Legislative Professionalism -1.239 1.387 -.89 
Divided Government -.321 .237 -1.36 
Difficult Amendment Procedure .198 .290 .68 
Longer Term Lengths -.097 .053 -1.82 
Observations 2,140 
LR2 24.82 
Log Likelihood -241.532 
*Significant at the .1 level or better 
 **  Significant the .05 level or better 
 
  Table 4.2 displays the results of the Stratified Cox regression analysis of the 
timing of docketed tort reform challenges.  The signs on the coefficients indicate whether 
the covariate is associated with an increase or decrease in the likelihood of a court having 
a docketed tort reform challenge.  A number of the hypothesized relationships are 
supported by the results, which provide evidence of strategic behavior at the agenda-
setting stage.  The interaction between the political environment and elite preferences, as 
well as the interaction between retention method and mass preferences, both achieve 
statistical significance in the expected direction.   
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 Institutional features also appear to influence the behavior of justices at the 
agenda-setting stage.  Court professionalism significantly increases the likelihood of a 
court having a docketed tort reform challenge.  Additionally, the presence of an 
intermediate appellate court would have achieved statistical significance if a one-tailed 
hypothesis was offered predicting that an intermediate appellate court would increase the 
likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.  While this result was not predicted by the 
SSOP model, the finding is supported by previous research.  Surprisingly, divided 
government and term length are signed in the unexpected direction and would have been 
statistically significant if so hypothesized. Legislative professionalism and amendment 
procedure fail to achieve statistical significance at any acceptable level.    
 Before discussing the substantive effects of the independent variables, I want to 
first draw attention to the different rates of docketing a tort reform challenge based on 
statute type.  Figure 4.1 demonstrates the necessity of using Stratified Cox methodology.  
Cases challenging the different statute types were docketed at different rates, with 
damage cap statutes docketed at a faster rate than statutes abolishing joint and several 
liability and the collateral source rule.  In Chapter III, the rate at which state legislatures 
enacted tort reform statutes varied according to statute type, with the state legislatures 
taking longer to enact controversial damage caps.  However, at the agenda-setting stage, 
we see the opposite relationship; courts accept challenges to these statutes at a faster rate.  
Overall, state supreme courts appear more likely to engage in judicial review of the most 
controversial types of tort reforms.  However, while this result seems to suggest that state 
courts are willing to challenge state legislatures on controversial issues, the model also 
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provides evidence that justices must sometimes behave strategically at the agenda-setting 
stage.   
 
Figure 4.1 Rates of Docketing Tort Reform Challenges according to Statute Type 
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 When the legislature can retaliate, the difference in elite preferences significantly 
decreases the likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.  Figure 4.2 graphically 
displays the likelihood of a court having a tort reform case on its docket when it is 
constrained (i.e. the legislature can retaliate) versus unconstrained (i.e. the legislature 
cannot retaliate).   When the political environment supports the legislature, liberal state 
supreme courts are less likely to hear a case challenging a tort reform statute.  Because 
liberal justices fear retaliation for voting their sincere preferences, they strategically avoid 
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docketing a tort reform challenge.   When a liberal court faces a conservative legislature 
in an environment conducive to tort reform, the likelihood of a tort reform challenge is 
less than forty percent compared to almost seventy percent when the court is 
unconstrained.   The results suggest that the relationship between a state supreme court 
and legislature is conditioned by the nature of the political environment.   When a court 
fears retaliation, it acts contrary to its sincere preferences at the agenda-setting stage.   
 
Figure 4.2 Interaction between the Political Environment and Elite Preferences 
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The SSOP model predicts that when courts are behaving sincerely, court 
liberalism should increase the likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge because 
there is more incentive for justices to change rather than simply uphold the status quo.   
The results support this strategy. In general, a state supreme court is more likely to have a 
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docketed tort reform challenge when it is increasingly more liberal than the state 
legislature.   Figure 4.3 displays the different rates in which state courts accepted a tort 
reform challenge based on whether they shared the preferences of the legislative branch.   
When the state supreme court and legislature have the same preferences, the likelihood of 
a docketed tort reform challenge by 2004 is seventy percent, compared to ninety percent 
when the court is more liberal than the state legislature.   In general, more liberal state 
courts are twenty percent more likely to have a docketed tort reform challenge than courts 
that are ideologically compatible with the state legislature.  However, when justices are 
constrained, preference differences signal likely retaliation, and substantially decrease the 
likelihood of a court docketing a tort reform challenge.      
 
Figure 4.3 The Effect of Ideological Distance on the Likelihood of Docket Tort Reform 
Challenge  
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While the overall political environment may constrain justices by making elite 
retaliation more likely, justices who face retention by the public must be concerned with 
electoral retaliation as well.  When justices are retained by the public, they are held 
directly accountable to public opinion.  Thus, justices are expected to behave strategically 
by avoiding cases when their sincere preferences diverge from those held in the mass 
public.   The results suggest that justices retained through election do engage in this type 
of strategic behavior. 
   Figure 4.4 shows the likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge when a 
liberal court is held accountable to a conservative public compared to a court that does 
face retention elections.  The non-elected court is over twenty percent more likely to have 
a docketed tort reform challenge than the court constrained by public opinion.  Justices 
appear to be sensitive to the threat of electoral retaliation.  When justices are held 
accountable to public opinion, justices behave strategically by avoiding cases when their 
preferences diverge from the mass public.  Thus, method of retention is an important 
institutional feature influencing judicial decision-making at the agenda-setting stage.  
Public opinion can have both an indirect and direct effect on judicial decision making 
depending on justice’s method of retention. 
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Figure 4.4 Interaction between Retention Method and Mass Preferences 
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 Differences in institutional professionalism also significantly affect the likelihood 
of a court having a docketed tort reform challenge.  I hypothesized that more professional 
state courts would be more likely to have a docketed tort reform challenges because they 
are more likely to possess both the desire and ability to pursue policy-minded goals.   
More professional courts are more likely to resent legislative enactment of tort reform 
and also have the resources necessary to act.   The results support the hypothesized 
relationship.  More professional state supreme courts are significantly more likely to have 
a tort reform challenge on their docket.   Figure 4.5 shows the difference in likelihood 
between the most and least professional state supreme courts.  The most professional 
state supreme court is fifty percent more likely to hear a tort reform challenge.   The 
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likelihood of the most professional state supreme court not hearing a tort reform 
challenge by 2004 is only ten percent compared to sixty percent for the least professional 
state supreme court.  Increased court professionalism dramatically increases the 
likelihood of a court having a docketed tort reform challenge. 
 
Figure 4.5 Effect of Court Professionalism on the Likelihood of a Docketed Tort Reform 
Challenge 
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 Surprisingly, legislative professionalism does not have a similar effect on the 
likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.   I expected that courts would be more 
likely to fear retaliation by more professional legislatures due to the greater resources at 
their disposal. However, while the coefficient is in the expected direction, legislative 
professionalism does not have a significant effect on judicial decision-making at the 
agenda-setting stage.  Perhaps, the nature of the political environment so accurately 
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captures the ability of a legislature to retaliate against the court that institutional features 
become insignificant.  While the court pays attention to the broader political environment 
and the policy preferences of the legislature, the professionalism of the legislature has no 
effect.  
 Additionally, a state’s amendment procedure has no significant effect at the 
agenda-setting stage.  This result is somewhat surprising given that both Langer (2002) 
and Stricko-Neubauer (2006) found that amendment difficulty significantly increased the 
likelihood of a docketed judicial review case over a range of case types.  The null result 
in my model may be due to the particular issue being studied.  Because of the nature of 
the tort reform issue, legislators might find that reenacting tort reform legislature is a 
more appealing form of retaliation than pursuing a constitutional amendment.   While 
statutes involving abortion and the death penalty are arguably more absolute in nature, 
tort reform is a complicated legal issue in which legislators can make small changes 
without altering the purpose of a statute.  For instance, recall the discussion of tort reform 
in Ohio. After the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a comprehensive tort reform statute 
in the Sheward case, the Ohio General Assembly enacted another damage cap statute 
very similar to the one previously struck down.  Only a handful of states have pursued 
tort reform constitutional amendments, and only Texas and Nevada have been 
successfully in capping damages through constitutional amendment.  Instead of 
constitutional amendment, state legislatures appear more likely to retaliate by enacting 
similar statutes. Thus, if courts do not expect legislatures to retaliate through 
constitutional means the difficulty of constitutional amendment would not influence their 
decision-making.      
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Figure 4.6 Effect of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Likelihood of a Docketed 
Tort Reform Challenge      
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 While the SSOP model predicts that courts with discretionary dockets have more 
of an opportunity to behave strategically at the agenda-setting stage, this result was not 
supported by the model.  Instead, states with intermediate appellate courts are twenty 
percent more likely to have a docketed tort reform challenge (refer to Figure 4.6).  This 
result is supported by previous research showing that states with intermediate appellate 
courts were more likely to have docketed judicial review cases (Langer 2002, Stricko-
Neubauer 2006).  Instead of encouraging strategic avoidance, perhaps the presence of an 
intermediate appellate court gives state supreme courts the discretion to choose cases that 
are the best vehicles for turning their policy preferences into law.   
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 While the model offers considerable support for a number of my hypotheses, the 
relationships that are perhaps the most difficult to explain are those that are signed in the 
unexpected direction.  The results suggest that divided government decreases the 
likelihood of a docketed tort reform challenge.  Langer (2002) actually found the same 
relationship involving judicial review challenges to campaign and election laws and 
Stricko-Neubauer (2006) with judicial review cases involving social issues.  Perhaps, 
when justices are able to behave sincerely they are more likely to challenge unified 
governments because they recognize that unified governments are more likely to 
dominate the policy-making process.  When governments are unified, courts might feel 
an increased need to protect the rights of the minority or simple to insert their own policy 
preferences into law.   
 Term length was also signed in the wrong direction.  In general, term length does 
not appear to be a strong indicator of a justice’s perceived fear of retaliation.  Previous 
research only provides minimal support for the relationship between term length and the 
likelihood of hearing a judicial review challenge; for the majority of issues term length 
had no significant effect on decision making at the agenda-setting stage (Langer 2002, 
Stricko-Neubauer 2006).   Additionally, the negative effect of longer term lengths is 
likely attributed to anomalies in the data.  States in which justices serve the longest terms 
(Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts) are not states in which tort reform 
has been aggressively pursued by the state legislatures.   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored the conditions under which justices are expected to 
behave strategically at the agenda-setting stage of judicial review.  Previous research 
suggests that strategic behavior is not limited to the decision on the merits stage and that 
justices behave strategically in light of other relevant actors in the political system.  The 
SSOP model developed in Chapter II made predictions about when the political 
environment and various institutional features are likely to constrain justices in the 
policy-making process.   The SSOP model and the empirical results support a strategic 
account of judicial decision-making in which justices act contrary to their sincere 
preferences when they fear legislative or electoral retaliation.  The relationship between 
the legislature and the court is conditioned by the nature of the broader political 
environment; the political environment signals to justices the strength of the coordinate 
branch.  When the political environment supports tort reform, state supreme courts are 
constrained by the preferences of the legislative branch.   
 However, all else being equal, state supreme courts act aggressively in deciding to 
engage in judicial review of tort reform statutes.  Justices accept challenges to damage 
cap statutes at a faster rate than the less controversial types of tort reforms.  Additionally, 
in general, state supreme courts are more likely to hear tort reform challenges when they 
are increasingly more liberal than the state legislators.  And more professional state 
supreme courts are much more likely to engage in judicial review of tort reform statutes.  
However, despite all the evidence of the willingness of the state supreme courts to engage 
in judicial review of tort reform statutes, courts are not unconstrained actors in the policy-
making process.   
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 Justices behave strategically in response to the threat of retaliation from the 
legislature and the mass public.  When the political environment signals that legislative 
retaliation is possible, a court is significantly less likely to engage in judicial review when 
its preferences diverge from the preferences of the legislature. The political environment 
has an indirect effect on the behavior of justices by warning the court when legislative 
retaliation is likely to occur.  Additionally, the preferences of the mass public have a 
direct effect on the behavior of state supreme courts when justices fear electoral 
retaliation.  When justices face competitive reelections, courts are significantly less likely 
to engage in judicial review of tort reform statutes when their preferences are not in line 
with public opinion.   
 The findings presented in this chapter further support my contention that the tort 
reform movement is best studied through a separation of powers lens.  The broader 
political environment and different institutional features, such as selection method, define 
the nature of the relationship between the coordinate branches at the agenda-setting stage 
of judicial review.  When justices fear retaliation for going against preferences of the 
legislature or mass public, they act strategically by avoiding cases challenging the 
constitutionality of tort reform statutes.  The model refines the conditions under which 
justices pursue sincere and strategic courses of action at the agenda-setting stage of 
judicial review.  Chapter V considers these conditions at the decision on the merits stage.       
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE DECISION ON THE MERITS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between the political environment, elite 
preferences, and institutional features in influencing an individual justice’s votes on the 
constitutionality of tort reform.  While the previous chapters demonstrated strategic 
decision-making by legislatures and courts, this chapter will allow for a further 
examination of both the extent of strategic behavior and the conditions under which 
strategic behavior is most likely to occur.   Directly taking into account the extent of 
strategic behavior at the agenda-setting stage, in this chapter I examine how the political 
environment and different institutional features affect individual justices’ decision-
making.  
At the decision on the merits stage, I expect justices to behave strategically when 
subjected to the same types of constraints explored in Chapter IV.  While courts were 
seen to behave strategically at the agenda-setting stage, there is still the potential for 
strategic behavior at the decision-making stage of judicial review.  Courts may have been 
precluded from strategically deflecting cases at the agenda-setting stage due to 
institutional constraints.  Or perhaps, justices are strategic actors but are not necessarily 
“super” strategic; meaning that while the threat of retaliation may not have been 
considered by all justices at the agenda-setting stage, the threat is recognized when 
justices must vote on the merits.  Indicators of the possibility of legislative retaliation are 
potentially more relevant at the decision-making stage of judicial review.  Additionally, 
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because the level of analysis is now the individual justice’s vote, I can more accurately 
examine the effect of preference divergence between each individual justice and the state 
legislature as well as the justices and the mass public.    Thus, I can now examine the 
effect of the broader political environment and institutional features on the behavior of 
individuals and revisit the conditional hypotheses examined in Chapter IV. 
 
Hypotheses 
In this model, I posit the same interaction between the broader political 
environment and elite preferences, and retention method and mass public opinion.  I 
hypothesize, 
H1:  When the political environment is supportive, the likelihood of a justice voting to 
strike down a tort reform statute decreases as a justice is increasingly more liberal than 
the state legislature. 
H2:  When justices are retained through competitive elections, the likelihood of a justice 
voting to strike down a tort reform statute decreases when a justice is increasingly more 
liberal than the mass public.  
 Additionally, other factors that might increase the threat of either legislative 
retaliation are expected to decrease the likelihood of a justice striking down a tort reform 
statute.  As examined in the previous chapters, institutional professionalism is expected to 
affect the relationship between the coordinate branches.  Court professionalism is 
expected to increase the likelihood of a justice striking down a tort reform statute because 
justices serving on more professional courts have the necessary resources to challenge the 
state legislature.   Increased legislative professionalism, on the other hand, is expected to 
increase the threat of retaliation and decrease the likelihood of a justice voting to strike 
down a tort reform statute.   
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H3:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute increases with 
an increase in court professionalism. 
H4: The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute decreases with 
an increase in legislative professionalism.  
 In addition, certain institutional features are expected to facilitate a state 
legislature’s ability to retaliate against a hostile court by enacting a new statute or 
pursuing a constitutional amendment.  While many of these features were not significant 
at the agenda-setting stage, perhaps individual justices are more sensitive to the role 
certain institutional features play in encouraging legislative retaliation at the decision-
making stage.  Thus, I hypothesize,  
H5:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute increases under 
periods of divided government. 
H6: The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute increases in 
states with a difficult amendment process. 
H7:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute decreases in 
states with a Republican governor.   
 While the influence of interest groups plays a part in defining the political 
environment, I also expect interest groups to play a direct role in influencing judicial 
decision-making.   As explained in Chapter I, the pro-reform interest groups have played 
a more effective role in pursuing outsider strategies than anti-reform interest groups.  
While pro-reform interest groups like the ATRA have chosen to “go public” and attempt 
to influence mass public opinion, anti-reform groups, such as the American Trial 
Lawyers Association, have chosen to primarily pursue an insider strategy and appeal 
directly to the legislators and justices through lobbying and submitting amicus briefs.   At 
the decision on the merits stage, I can examine the effect of interest groups pursuing an 
insider strategy to directly influence judicial decision-making.   I hypothesize,    
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H8:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute decreases as 
the number of pro-reform amicus briefs outnumbers the anti-reform amicus briefs.   
 
 Additionally, I consider the influence of the lower court decision. I expect that 
when the lower court has struck down a tort reform statute, a justice will be more likely 
to vote against the constitutionality of the statute.  Research has show that justices are 
more likely to strike down statutes when a lower court has found the statute 
unconstitutional (Emmert 1992, Langer 2002). Thus, I hypothesize, 
H9:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute increases when 
the lower court has struck down the tort reform statute. 
 Finally, I control for the effect of case salience on judicial decision-making in a 
number of ways.  First, I use the total number of amicus briefs filed as a surrogate 
measure of case salience.   Amicus briefs have been used as a measure of case salience in 
other studies of judicial decision-making (see Maltzmann and Walhbeck 1996) and in this 
analysis the measure does not elicit the drawbacks identified by Epstein and Segal (2000) 
because I focus on only one issue area.  Additionally, I look at the influence of the type of 
statute being challenged.  In the previous chapters, I discussed how damage cap statutes 
are considered more controversial than statutes abolishing joint and several liability and 
the collateral source rule.  While the state legislatures enacted damage cap statutes at 
slower rates than the other statute types, state supreme courts accepted challenges to 
damage cap statutes at a faster rate.  Hence, I expect that statute type might affect the 
likelihood of justices voting to strike down a tort reform statute.   
 I expect that the type of constitutional challenge raised by the litigants might 
have an effect on judicial decision-making.  Particularly, I am interested in how justices 
react to a direct separation of powers challenge.   When a litigant raises a separation of 
powers challenge, this might signal to the justices the importance of the case not only in 
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terms of issue salience, but in terms of the court’s institutional position vis-à-vis the 
legislature.  The expected effect of each of these salience variables might be different 
depending on whether justices engage in sincere or strategic decision-making.  Hence, I 
simply control for these variables by offering two-tailed hypotheses: 
H10:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute 
increases/decreases as the number of amicus briefs filed increases.  
H11:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute 
increases/decreases when the court is considering a damage cap statute.   
H12:  The likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute 
increases/decreases when a separation of powers challenge has been raised.   
Table 5.1 summarizes the relationships I expect between the independent 
variables and the likelihood of a justice voting to strike down a tort reform statute.  
Table 5.1 Expected Relationships between the Independent Variables and the Likelihood 
of a Court Hearing a Tort Reform Challenge 
Independent Variables Likelihood of a Vote to Strike Down a Tort 
Reform Statute 
Supportive Environment x (Court 
Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism) 
_ 
Elected Court x (Court Liberalism-Mass 
Public Liberalism) 
_ 
Court Professionalism + 
Legislative Professionalism - 
Divided Government + 
Republican Governor - 
Amicus + or - 
Pro-Reform Amicus - 
Damage Cap Statute + or - 
SOP Challenge + or - 
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Research Design and Methodology 
The dependent variable in this model is an individual justice’s vote to strike down 
a tort reform statute.  The value of the dependent variable is equal to one if a justice votes 
to strike down a tort reform statute and zero otherwise.   I consider the individual 
justices’ votes in cases challenging the constitutionality of the four types of tort reform 
statutes considered in the previous chapters: 1) caps on punitive damages; 2) caps on 
noneconomic damages; 3) statutes abolishing joint and several liability; 4) statutes 
abolishing the collateral source rule.  The state supreme court cases challenging tort 
reform statutes between 1983 and 2004 were identified by Schwartz and Lorber (2001) 
and Behrens.  I identified the tort reform challenges considered before 1983 through a 
Westlaw search of the statute numbers of tort reforms enacted prior to 1983.   Table 5.2 
lists the cases included in this analysis and Figure 5.1 displays the proportion of votes 
corresponding to each statute type.  Noneconomic and punitive damage caps were 
included as one category in Figure 5.1 because sometimes legislatures do not distinguish 
between the two, and instead place a cap on general damages instead.   
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Table 5.2 Case Citations 
State Year Case Citation 
Alabama 1991 592 So. 2d. 156 
Alabama 1991 581 So. 2d. 414 
Alabama 1991 589 So.2d 184 
Alabama 1993 627. So. 2d. 878 
Alabama 1995 671 So. 2d. 1334 
Alabama 1996 681 So. 2d 1337 
Alabama 2000 782 So. 2d 223 
Alaska 1998 964 P. 2d 453 
Alaska 2002 56 P.3d 1046 
Alaska 2003 78 P.3d 710 
Arizona 1977 570 P.2d 744 
California 1985 695 P.2d 665 
California 1988 44 Cal.3d 1188 
Colorado 1992 824 P.2d 783 
Colorado 1992 827 P.2d 531 
Colorado 1993 851 P.2d 901 
Colorado 2004 95 P.3d 571 
Delaware 1995 668 A.2d 1370 
Florida 1981 403 So. 2d. 1325 
Florida 1986 498 So. 2d 421 
Florida 1987 507 So.2d 1080 
Florida 1992 608 So.2d 800 
Florida 1993 618 So.2d 189 
Florida 2000 761 So. 2d 1040 
Georgia 1991 261 Ga. 41 
Georgia 1993 436 S.E.2d 632 
Georgia 1993 436 S.E. 2d 635 
Georgia 1993 434 S.E.2d 450 
Idaho 2000 4  P.3d 1115 
Illinois 1997 179 Ill.2d 367 
Indiana 2003 789 N.E.2d 467 
Iowa 1980 293 N.W. 2d 550 
Iowa 1985 369 N.W. 2d 417 
Iowa 1991 473 N.W. 2d 612 
Kansas 1983 661 P.2d  1251 
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Kansas 1985 237 Kan. 503 
Kansas 1987 241 Kan. 663 
Kansas 1988 243 Kan. 333 
Kansas 1989 778 P.2d 823 
Kansas 1990 246 Kan. 336 
Kansas 1991 248 Kan. 824 
Kansas 1993 254 Kan. 315 
Kansas 1993 252 Kan. 1010 
Kansas 2001 19 P.3d 132 
Kentucky 1995 892 S.W.2d 571 
Louisiana 1992 607 So.2d 517 
Maine 1991 597 A. 2d 50 
Maryland 1992 325 Md. 342 
Massachusetts 1989 541 N.E. 2d 329 
Michigan 2004 685 N.W.2d 174 
Minnesota 1990 463 N.W.2d 722 
Minnesota 1990 453 N.W.2d 326 
Missouri 1992 832 S.W.2d 898 
Missouri 1993 863 S.W. 2d 876 
Missouri 1997 947 S.W.2d 424 
Missouri 2002 79 S.W.3d 901 
Montana 1989 238 Mont. 21 
Montana 1994 267 Mont. 237 
Montana 1996 927 P.2d 1011 
Montana 2003 68 P.3d 654 
Nebraska 1987 412 N.W.2d 438 
Nebraska 2003 663 N.W.2d 43 
New Hampshire 1981 121 N.H. 894 
New Hampshire 1980 424 A. 2d 825 
New Hampshire 1991 134 N.H. 50 
New Hampshire 1999 143 N.H. 523 
North Carolina 2004 594 S.E.2d 1 
Ohio 1991 61 Ohio St.3d 624 
Ohio 1991 576 N.E.2d 765 
Ohio 1994 71 Ohio St.3d 552 
Ohio 1994 69 Ohio St.3d 415 
Ohio 1995 73 Ohio St.3d 260 
Ohio 1999 86 Ohio St.3d 451 
Ohio 1999 87 Ohio St.3d 204 
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Ohio 2001 748 N.E.2d 1111 
Ohio 2004 808 N.E.2d 381 
Oregon 1995 322 Or. 281 
Oregon 1999 987 P.2d 463 
Oregon 2002 47 P.3d 476 
Oregon 2002 51 P.3d 1232 
South Carolina 1990 391 S.E. 2d 564 
South Carolina 1992 413 S.E.2d 31 
South Dakota 1996 544 N.W.2d 183 
Texas 1988 757 S.W. 2d 687 
Texas 1990 801 S.W. 2d 841 
Utah 2004 103 P.3d 135 
Virginia 1989 376 S.E.2d 525 
Virginia 1999 509 S.E.2d 307 
Washington 1989 771 P.2d 711 
West Virginia 1991 414 S.E. 2d 877 
West Virginia 2001 552 S.E.2d 406 
Wisconsin 1995 531 N.W.2d 70 
Wisconsin 2000 63 N.W.2d 120 
Wisconsin 2001 628 N.W.2d 842 
Wisconsin 2004 682 N.W.2d 866 
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Figure 5.1 Proportion of Cases by Case Type 
 
 
Through carefully reading of these cases I obtained the dependent variable of 
interest, each justice’s decision on the constitutionality of the tort reform statute, as well 
many of the important independent variables included in the model.  The cases were 
coded by the author on a number of different dimensions including: each justice’s vote to 
strike down or uphold the statute in question; whether or not each justice was in the 
majority; each justice’s opinion behavior, whether the court affirmed or reversed the 
lower court decision, whether the lower court had struck down a tort reform statutes, the 
statute type, title, and year enacted; the constitutional challenges raised, and number of 
amicus briefs filed supporting and opposing tort reform.   
 The coding of these cases provided the necessary data to test hypotheses H8-H12.  
The rest of the hypotheses are tested utilizing the same data and operationalizations as 
described in Chapters III and IV.   Additionally, I control for the dependence between the 
two stages of judicial review by incorporating the Inverse Mill’s Ratio generated from the 
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agenda-setting model into this model as independent variable.3  The Inverse Mill’s Ratio 
is critical because the strategic calculations seen in the agenda-setting model affect the 
cases that are decided on the merits.  Ignoring the effect of strategic decision-making at 
the agenda-setting stage would result in selection bias and biased coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3 In order to calculate the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR), I had to estimate the agenda-setting model using 
probit analysis rather than the Stratified Cox analysis described in Chapter IV.  While I believe that the 
Stratified Cox model is superior to the probit model for analyzing the agenda-setting stage, using probit 
analysis did not change the direction or significance of the independent variables, demonstrating that 
incorporating the IMR from the probit model is a sufficient control for the agenda-setting stage in this 
model.  Also, because my dependent variable is a different unit of analysis in the agenda-setting stage, I use 
the IMR for the court/year for each justice on the court.  While this is not as accurate a correction as having 
a single IMR for each justice, it is the best possible alternative given data availability and is superior to 
simply ignoring the agenda-setting stage (Langer 2002).   
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Results 
Table 5.3 Probit Analysis of an Individual Justice’s Vote to find a Tort Reform Statute 
Unconstitutional 1975-2004 
 
Covariate Coefficient Std. Error Z-Score 
Supportive Environment x (Court Liberalism-
Legislative Liberalism) 
-.013 .007 -1.91** 
Supportive Environment -.541 .214 -2.53*** 
Court Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism .012 .005 2.46*** 
Elected Court x (Court Liberalism-Mass Public 
Liberalism) 
-.006 .006 -.99 
Elected Court .595 .142 4.18*** 
Court Liberalism-Mass Public Liberalism .001 .006 .15 
Court Professionalism .252 .619 .41 
Legislative Professionalism -.3201 .782 -4.09*** 
Divided Government .307 .126 2.43*** 
Difficult Amendment Procedure .379 .169 2.24** 
Republican Governor .301 .201 1.50 
Amicus .055 .032 1.73** 
Pro-Reform Amicus -.095 .051 -1.83** 
Damage Cap Statute -.053 .132 -.40 
SOP Challenge -.089 .151 -.60 
Lower Court Finds UC .188 .191 .99 
Selection Variable: Inverse Mill’s Ratio .984 .402 2.45*** 
Observations 599 
Log Likelihood= -349.813 
Pseudo R2= 0.134 
*Significant at the .1 level or better 
**Significant at the .05 level or better 
*** Significant at the .01 level or better 
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Table 5.3 displays the results of the probit analysis of an individual justice’s vote 
to strike down or uphold a tort reform statute.  The signs of the coefficients indicate 
whether the covariate is associated with an increase or decrease in the likelihood of a 
justice finding a tort reform statute unconstitutional.  Table 5.4 displays the predicted 
probabilities of a justice voting to find a statute unconstitutional at different levels of the 
statistically significant independent variables.  The predicted probabilities indicate the  
maximum substantive effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of an Unconstitutional Vote 
 
 
Before discussing the results of the independent variables, I want to first draw 
attention to the significance of the selection variable, the Inverse Mill’s ratio.  The 
significance of this variable indicates that case selection at the agenda-setting stage 
affects a justice’s vote on the merits.  When the selection variable is removed from the 
Situation Probability of Unconstitutional Vote 
All Variables at Mean 38.34% 
Supportive Environment x (Court Liberalism-
Legislative Liberalism)  
17.04% 
Supportive Environment 21.68% 
Court Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism 69.44% 
Elected Court 48.15% 
Legislative Professionalism 6.16% 
Divided Government 43.52% 
Difficult Amendment Procedure 41.73% 
Republican Governor 43.91% 
Amicus Briefs 65.74% 
Pro-Reform Amicus Briefs 17.59% 
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model, the substantive results of the model are affected.  While the statistical significance 
of the coefficients remains unchanged, the substantive impact of several variables change 
when the selection variable is removed from the model.  The impact of legislative 
professionalism, the political environment, the interaction between the political 
environment and elite preferences, and the ideological distance between the court and 
legislature are all overestimated, while the impact of the amendment procedure, amicus 
briefs, pro-reform briefs, and retention method are underestimated.   When the decision 
on the merits stage is considered in isolation of the agenda-setting stage, biased and 
inefficient coefficients are produced.  Ignoring the agenda-setting stage leads one to 
underemphasize the importance of institutional variables and overemphasize the role of 
elite preferences.  Additionally, excluding the agenda-setting stage reduces the overall fit 
of the model.  Judicial decision-making is most accurately captured when the relationship 
between the two stages of judicial review is recognized.  The inclusion of the selection 
variable into the model increases my confidence in the relationships found between the 
other independent variables and a justice’s decision on the merits.     
  Several of the hypothesized relationships are supported by the results of the 
model.  The results suggest that strategic behavior is not limited to the agenda-setting 
stage of judicial review and that the political environment conditions the relationship 
between the coordinate branches at the decision on the merits stage.  As witnessed at both 
the enactment stage and the agenda-setting stage, the interaction between the political 
environment and elite preferences is statistically significant in the expected direction.  
When the political environment is supportive, the difference in elite preferences 
significantly decreases the likelihood of justice finding a statute unconstitutional.  When 
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all variables are held at their mean, the likelihood of a justice finding a tort reform statute 
unconstitutional is a little over thirty-eight percent.  However, when the political 
environment is supportive and the legislature is expected to retaliate, increased 
ideologically distance between a justice and the state legislature decreases the likelihood 
of an unconstitutional vote by over twenty percent.  When a liberal justice faces a 
conservative legislature in a supportive political environment, the likelihood of a justice 
voting to strike down a tort reform statute is only seventeen percent.  Figure 5.2 displays 
the change in predicted probabilities as a justice becomes increasingly more liberal than 
the state legislature.  When justices fear legislative retaliation they are significantly less 
likely to strike down a tort reform statute. 
 
Figure 5.2 The Effect of the Interaction Between the Political Environment and Elite 
Preferences on the Probability of Voting to Strike Down a Tort Reform Statute 
 
 
Court Liberalism-Legislative Liberalism 
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Additionally, unlike in the agenda-setting model, a number of additional variables 
meant to capture the ability of the legislature to retaliate against the court achieve 
statistical significance. A difficult amendment procedure and the presence of divided 
government both have a statistically significant, although small, effect on judicial 
decision-making.  A difficult amendment procedure increases the likelihood of an 
unconstitutional vote by a little over three percent, and the presence of divided 
government increase the likelihood by a little over five percent.  
The degree of professionalism of the state legislature has a substantial impact on 
the likelihood of a justice finding a tort reform statute unconstitutional.  While legislative 
professionalism did not have a statistically significant effect at the agenda-setting stage, 
legislative professionalism does constrain justices at the decision on the merits stage of 
judicial review.  Though high levels of legislative professionalism do not keep courts 
from engaging in judicial review, it dramatically decreases the likelihood of a justice 
voting to strike down a tort reform challenge.  State supreme justices are much less likely 
to challenge more professional state legislatures.   When facing the most professional 
state legislature, justices will only strike down a tort reform statute six percent of the time 
compared to nearly sixty percent of the time when facing the least professional 
legislature.  Figure 5.3 displays the change in predicted probabilities going from the least 
to most professional state legislature.   
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Figure 5.3 The Effect of Legislative Professionalism on the Probability of Voting to 
Strike Down a Tort Reform Statute 
 
Legislative Professionalism 
 
Also, somewhat surprisingly, justices retained through competitive retention 
elections are significantly more likely to find a tort reform statute unconstitutional. 
Justices retained through competitive retention elections are almost ten percent more 
likely to vote to strike down a tort reform statute.  This result may be interpreted as 
another constraint imposed by other elite actors on the behavior of justices.  The result 
might be driven by the unwillingness of justices retained through gubernatorial or 
legislative approval to strike down legislative enactments.  This result makes sense if we 
assume that tort reform is traditionally more salient to elites than mass actors.  While the 
pro-reform movement has infiltrated the mass public to various degrees, the tort reform 
movement has been elite-driven.  Thus, it makes sense that justices would fear retaliation 
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more in states in which they are retained through gubernatorial or legislative approval 
rather than competitive elections.   
 Thus, while the results indicate that justices behave strategically in fear of 
retaliation from the legislative branch, justices do not appear to be directly constrained by 
the preferences of the mass public at the decision on the merits stage.  While the 
interaction between retention method and mass preferences is in the expected direction, it 
did not achieve statistical significance at any acceptable level.  However, a supportive 
political environment statistically decreases the likelihood of a justice finding a tort 
reform statute unconstitutional regardless of his or her ideological distance from the 
legislative branch. Justices are over sixteen percent less likely to vote to strike down a 
tort reform statute when the political environment supports tort reform.  While citizen 
preferences alone have no effect of judicial decision-making, the political environment 
has both a direct and indirect effect on the behavior of justices at the decision on the 
merits stage.   
Interest group participation also appears to exert both a direct and indirect effect 
on judicial decision-making. While the presence of the American Tort Reform 
Association, as encompassed in the political environment, decreases the likelihood of a 
justice voting against a tort reform statute, amicus briefs submitted to the court have a 
direct and substantively significant effect on the behavior of justices as well.  As the 
number of pro-reform amicus briefs increases the likelihood of a justice finding a tort 
reform statute unconstitutional decreases by over twenty percent.   When the number of 
briefs opposing tort reform exceeds the amount of briefs in favor of tort reform at its 
maximum, the likelihood of an unconstitutional vote is over fifty percent compared to 
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less than twenty percent when the pro-amicus briefs exceed the opposing briefs at the 
maximum level.  Figure 5.4 graphically displays the difference in predicted probabilities 
based on the number of briefs supporting and opposing tort reform. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The Effect of Pro-Reform Amicus Briefs on the Probability of Voting to Strike 
Down a Tort Reform Statute 
 
 
Pro-Reform Amicus Briefs  
  
While justices are influenced by both the broader political environment and the 
preferences and retaliatory strength of the legislative branch, justices are not simply blind 
followers of the legislative branch.  In general, justices are more likely to strike down a 
tort reform statute when they are increasingly more liberal than the state legislature.  
Justices who are more liberal than the state legislature are nearly thirty percent more 
likely to find a tort reform statute unconstitutional than justices who are ideologically 
compatible with the legislature.  Figure 5.5 displays the differences in predicted 
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probabilities as a justice becomes increasingly more liberal than the state legislature.   
When justices are behaving sincerely, judicial liberalism significantly increases the 
likelihood of an unconstitutional vote.    
 
Figure 5.5  The Effect of Elite Ideological Distance on the Probability of Voting to Strike 
Down a Tort Reform Statute 
 
 
Court Liberalism 
 
Court ideology is the most salient predictor of sincere behavior at the decision on 
the merits stage of judicial review. While court professionalism significantly increases 
the likelihood of a court hearing a judicial review challenge, court professional does not 
significantly influence a justice’s decision on the merits.  Though the level of court 
professionalism influences the desire and ability of justices to insert their preferences into 
the policy-making process, it does not appear to affect their actual preferences for or 
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against tort reform.   More professional courts are more likely to hear challenges to tort 
reform statutes, but court professionalism has no significant effect on an individual 
justice’s decision to strike down tort reform statutes.    
While justices are motivated by policy preferences, they also appear to be 
motivated by the level of case salience as measured by the total number of amicus briefs 
filed.   Figure 5.6 displays the change in predicted probabilities from no amicus briefs to 
the maximum number filed.   As the number of amicus briefs increases, the likelihood of 
a tort reform statute being found unconstitutional increases by over thirty percent.   In 
general, justices appear to use salient cases as a venue for striking down tort reform 
statutes.  Instead of bending to the will of the legislature in the most salient cases and 
asserting themselves in less high profile cases, justices appear more willing to strike 
down statutes when other actors are paying attention.   
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Figure 5.6 The Effect of Amicus Briefs on the Probability of Voting to Strike Down a 
Tort Reform Statute 
 
 
Amicus Briefs 
 
  
 While case salience has a significant effect on a justice’s decision on the merits, 
case type has no discernable effect at this stage of judicial review.  While state supreme 
courts were more likely to engage in judicial review of damage cap statutes, there is no 
statistically significant difference between justices’ decisions on the merits based on 
statute type.  This finding emphasizes the importance of incorporating the agenda-setting 
stage into the model.  When looking at the agenda-setting stage in isolation, one might 
assume that justices were accepting cases challenging damage caps statutes at a faster 
rate because they were looking to strike them down, however the model does not support 
this relationship.    
 A lower court decision finding a tort reform statute unconstitutional has no effect 
on a state supreme court justice’s decision on the merits.   While this result was initially 
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surprising considering the success of this variable in other studies of judicial review, a 
closer look at the data helps to explain this null result.  In this issue area, the 
constitutionality of a tort reform statute was rarely raised in the lower courts.  Lower 
courts overruled a tort reform statute in only eight cases.  In the vast majority of the 
cases, no constitutional challenge was raised in the lower court or the court certified the 
constitutional question to the state supreme court without ruling on the merits.   
 Additionally the type of constitutional challenge raised did not have a statistically 
significant effect on a justice’s vote on the merits.  There was no significant relationship 
between the likelihood of striking down a tort reform statute and a separation of powers 
constitutional challenge.   Perhaps this null result is due to the conflicting behaviors 
discussed in the two-tailed hypothesis.  A separation of powers challenge might exert 
different influences on the behavior of justices depending on whether they fear retaliation 
by the legislature.  While a separation of powers challenge might further dissuade a 
constrained court from striking down a statute, it equally might energize an unconstrained 
court’s desire to strike down a statute.  Hence, in future work I plan test how case facts, 
such as the type of constitutional challenge raised, interact with environmental variables.  
Finally, the most puzzling result was the direction of the coefficient for 
Republican governorship and the fact that the variable would have been significant if so 
hypothesized.  Contrary to my hypothesis, the model shows that justices are more likely 
to overturn a tort reform statute when the governor is Republican.  While initially puzzled 
by these results, I discovered the problem of using the party of the governor as a 
surrogate for gubernatorial policy preference.  Due to the large span of years my data 
encompasses, 1975-2004, Republicanism reflects different policy preferences based on 
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the years and states in question.  To test whether this effect was influencing this variable, 
I tested the model only looking at cases decided after 1988, when the election of H.W. 
Bush confirmed the strength of the Republican Party in the South (Moreland, Steed, and 
Baker 1991).   When I tested the model on this subset of cases, the governor party 
variable was no longer statistically significant in any direction while the significance of 
all the other variables remained constant.       
 
Conclusion 
The results of this model demonstrate that justices are forward-thinking actors 
who realize the threat of retaliation by the legislative branch when deciding whether to 
strike down tort reform statutes.  While strategic behavior was recognized at the agenda-
setting stage, strategic behavior is not limited to the agenda-setting stage.   The threat of 
retaliation by the legislature is actually a more salient predictor of judicial decision-
making on the merits.  Justices are less likely to strike down a statute when the political 
environment is supportive and they are more liberal than the state legislature.  
Additionally, justices are less likely to strike down a tort reform statute when the 
legislature is more professional.  Justices are more likely to strike down a statute when 
institutional conditions reduce the threat of retaliation; justices are more likely to 
invalidate statutes under periods of divided government and in states with a difficult 
amendment procedure.      
 Once again, the model supports a conditional relationship between the political 
environment and elite preferences.  When justices fear retaliation they behave 
strategically by voting against their sincere preferences. The model also demonstrates that 
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when justices are unconstrained they aggressively pursue their policy preferences.  In 
general, liberal justices are substantially more likely to strike down tort reforms.   Also 
justices are more likely to strike down tort reforms when other elite actors are paying 
attention; as the total number of amicus briefs filed increases, justices are more likely to 
invalidate tort reform statutes.   
 This final empirical model demonstrates that strategic behavior occurs at each 
stage of the policy-making process.  The SSOP model predicts that if legislators and 
justices had perfect information, strategic behavior would be essentially limited to the 
enactment and agenda-setting stages.  We would not witness tort reform statutes being 
struck down because a legislature would not enact a tort reform statute if it could not 
retaliate against a hostile court, and a court would not strike down a statute if the 
legislature could retaliate.  Chapter III demonstrated that strategic decision-making does 
occur at the enactment stage; judicial preferences significantly affect legislative decision-
making when the legislature cannot retaliate.  Chapter IV demonstrated that justices 
strategically deflect cases based on legislative preferences and the political environment.  
Finally, this model demonstrates that even when these previous strategic calculations are 
taken into account, justices still sometimes act contrary to their sincere preferences at the 
decision-making stage of judicial review.   
The results substantiate the presence of strategic behavior in the first two stages, 
while simultaneously demonstrating that strategic behavior still occurs in this final stage.  
Justices only voted to strike down tort reform statutes thirty-eight percent of the time.  
While this percentage might seem low when thinking about the tort reform movement as 
a separation of powers battle between courts and legislatures, the percentage makes sense 
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when considering the strategic calculations made by the state legislatures at the 
enactment stage.   Additionally, the significance of the selection variable in this model, 
substantiates the conclusion from Chapter IV that strategic behavior occurs at the agenda-
setting stage.  The case selection process is not random and does affect individual 
justices’ votes on the merits.  Finally, though strategic calculations were made at each 
subsequent stage, justices still take strategic considerations into account when deciding 
on the merits.  The interaction between the political environment, elite preferences, and 
institutional features substantially impact judicial decision-making.       
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates how public policy is formulated under a system of 
separated powers.  Through formal and empirical analyses, the dissertation analyses how 
the inter-dependent decision making of elite actors shapes the types of polices emerging 
from the fifty states.   The State Separation of Powers model developed in Chapter II 
introduces a general theory of decision-making in a system of separated powers which is 
then tested in the real-world context of tort reform in the fifty states.  The dissertation is 
meant to serve as both a comprehensive model of how policy is formulated in the state 
governments and a comprehensive explanation of how the tort reform movements has 
developed.  Studying the tort reform movement through a separation of powers lens not 
only illuminates the current state of knowledge on tort reform but also provides an ideal 
natural experimental setting in which to advance a separation of powers theory.    Hence, 
the dissertation makes a contribution to the literatures on separation of powers, state 
policy-making, and tort reform.  
 Previously, most of the existing literature on tort reform has been descriptive or 
normative in nature, focused on describing in detail the tort reform movement in a single 
state (Moore 2006, Daniels and Martin 2006, Kahlenberg 2006) or arguing for or against 
legislative or judicial intervention in the policy-making process (Conroy 2006, Kelly and 
Mello 2005, Johnston 2007).  Public law scholars have joined the popular debate on tort 
reform using both legal and political rationales to defend their arguments.  While 
sophisticated arguments have been developed justifying and denouncing the behavior of 
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states justices and legislators, they do not offer a comprehensive explanation of elite 
behavior by generating precise hypotheses that can be empirically tested.  In contrast, I 
argue that the tort reform movement is best examined through a dynamic separation of 
powers model and a comparative empirical design.   
I argue that vast differences in tort law across the fifty states are a direct result of 
the dynamic interaction between state legislatures and state courts.  The debate over tort 
reform has produced a legally and politically salient battle between the coordinate 
branches with both legislatures and justices seeking to insert their policy preferences into 
the law.  The collective decision-making of these elite actors has significantly influenced 
state tort litigation leading to disparate outcomes for citizens pursuing civil litigation 
from one state to the next.  The tort reform issue truly highlights the effect of elite 
decision-making on the lives of citizens.   
 Additionally, what makes tort reform theoretically interesting is that the battle 
over tort law has taken place in an institutional context which promotes strategic 
behavior.   Because judges and legislatures recognize that the future of tort law rests upon 
their joint interactions they have the incentive to behave strategically in reaction to the 
anticipated behavior of one another.  This dissertation has considered the potential for 
strategic behavior at each stage of the policy-making process.  Through the SSOP model 
and empirical analysis, the dissertation identifies the conditions that encourage strategic 
behavior by legislatures when choosing whether to enact statutes, and the conditions 
encouraging strategic behavior by justices when exercising the power of judicial review. 
 While the impact of a separation of powers system and the strategic behavior of 
elite actors has been studied in a number of ways, few studies have analyzed the impact 
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of a separation of powers through a comprehensive multi-method approach.  
Additionally, while SOP models have been developed in connection with the studies of 
the Supreme Court and Congress, they have been far less employed in the study of state 
policymaking. The SSOP model developed in Chapter II captures the dynamic 
relationship between legislatures and courts while simultaneously controlling for the 
influence of the political environment and institutional structure.  The SSOP model 
introduces a number of theoretical contributions to the study of state policy-making and 
elite decision-making.  The SSOP model has predictive power, indentifying the 
conditions under which legislatures and courts should pursue certain courses of action. 
Additionally, the model explains how varying the institutional structure influences 
elite decision-making.  When the institutional structure of the formal model is varied, the 
actors’ decision-making thresholds change.   The model predicts that when justices are 
not beholden to public opinion and do not have a discretionary docket, they are more 
likely to find a statute unconstitutional at the decision on the merits stage of judicial 
review.   
The SSOP model highlights the interdependent nature of state policy making, 
leading to an observation previously untested in the literature.  The SSOP model indicates 
that the relationship between legislative and judicial preferences is conditioned by the 
political environment.  Legislatures assess their strength by considering the status of the 
political environment.  When legislatures are convinced that the political environment is 
supportive of their policy goals, legislatures do not have take into account the preferences 
of the court.  When the political environment is supportive, legislatures have the political 
capital to retaliate against a hostile court if necessary.  However, when the political 
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environment is less supportive the legislature retaliation against the court is costly and 
judicial preferences must be considered.  Thus, under certain circumstances the court has 
preemptive power over the enactment of legislation.   
Chapter III further explores how the interdependent relationship between 
legislatures and state courts promotes strategic behavior at the legislative enactment 
stage.  The empirical model defines the conditions under which courts are expected to 
have preemptive power over the enactment of legislation.   I utilize an event history 
model that considers the rate and likelihood of the enactment of tort reform legislation 
across all fifty states between 1997 and 2004.  The empirical results support a conditional 
relationship between the political environment and elite preferences.  When the 
legislature does not have the political capital to retaliate, court preferences significantly 
influence the enactment of tort reform statutes.  A constrained legislature is seventy 
percent less likely to enact legislation than a legislature operating in a supportive political 
environment.   
 The results of Chapter IV further support the conditional relationship between the 
political environment and elite preferences.  When the political environment supports tort 
reform, justices opposed to tort reform are constrained by the preferences of the 
legislative branch.  Justices anticipate the threat of retaliation by both the legislature and 
the mass public.   When justices face competitive reelections, courts are less likely to 
engage in judicial review when their preferences diverge from the mass public.  The 
results of the event history model refine the conditions under which justices pursue 
sincere and strategic courses of action at the agenda-setting stage.  The broader political 
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environment and the institutional structure affect the relationship between the legislature 
and court at the agenda-setting stage of judicial review.    
Chapter V demonstrates that contrary to the predictions of the SSOP model, 
strategic behavior is not limited to the enactment and agenda-setting stages.  The threat of 
retaliation by the legislature remains a salient predictor of judicial decision-making on the 
merits. Justices are less likely to strike down a tort reform statute when the political 
environment is supportive and the legislature is more conservative.  Additionally justices 
are less likely to strike down a statute when the institutional conditions encourage 
retaliation by the legislature. At the decision-making stage, justices are influenced by 
their own preferences and the preferences of the legislative branch, the political 
environment, and the state’s institutional structure.   
Through a formal model and a fifty state comparative design, this dissertation 
tests a vast array of contextual and institutional hypotheses concerning the strategic 
behavior of elite actors.   Testing the hypotheses in the context of state tort reform, this 
dissertation provides not only a comprehensive explanation of how the tort reform 
movement has developed, but also introduces a general theory of elite decision making in 
a separation of powers system.  The empirical results demonstrate that strategic behavior 
occurs at each stage of the policy making process and further refines the conditions in 
which strategic behavior is expected.   The results support my argument that state public 
policy is the end result of the interaction between elite preferences, political environment, 
and institutional structure.    
   
 
 
 
151 
 
APPENDIX 
 
I. Legislature’s Retaliation Threshold: 
EU(R)= q (α-2β-2ε)  +  (1-q) (α-2ε) 
EU(~R)= q(-β-ε)+ (1-q)(-ε) 
-2βα+α-2ε>-βq-ε 
Retaliate iff q< ε-α/-β 
II. Court’s Avoidance Threshold: 
 
EU(C)= q(A-c) + (1-q)A 
 
EU(A)= A 
 
Find UC iff -cq =0 
 
III. Judicial Veto Threshold: 
 
Case I. When q< α/β ( i.e. the Legislature will retaliate.) 
EU(A)=0 or 0 
EU(UC) –I or –I-c 
Court will always avoid taking case in this scenario. 
 
Case II. When q ≥ α/β  (i.e. the Legislature will not retaliate.)  
EU(UC)= q(A) + (1-q) (A-c) 
EU(A)=0 
A-c=cq>0 
Find UC if q < c-A/c 
 
IV. Legislature’s Enactment Threshold: 
 
Case I. When q>c-A/c i.e. The Court will not veto. 
 
EU(~E)=0 
EU(E)= (1-p)(1-q)(α-ε)+(1-p)(q)(α-β-ε)+(p)(1-q)(α-e)+pq(α-β-e) 
Enact iff q<α-ε/β 
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Case II. When q<c-A/c and q>ε-α/-β i.e. The Court will veto and the Legislature will not 
retaliate. 
EU(~E)=0 
EU(E)=-ε,-β-ε,-ε, -β-ε 
The Legislature will never enact under in this scenario. 
 
Case III. When q<c-A/c and q<ε-α/-β i.e. The Court will veto and the Legislature will 
retaliate. 
EU(~E) 
EU(E)=(1-p)(1-q)(α-2ε)+(1-p)(q)(α-2β-2ε)+(p)(1-q)(α-2ε)+pq(α-2β-2ε) 
Enact iff q<α-2ε/2β 
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